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## EOSC-Future & RDA Artificial Intelligence/Data Visitation Workgroup

# AI Bill of Rights Recommendation

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Subject matter experts from across the globe developed these recommendations to promote fundamental human rights and advance trust in AI for Open Science for European and global platform communities from perspectives engaging ethics, law, medicine, and social considerations in Artificial Intelligence, Data Sharing, Data Visitation, and Open Science policy development. These recommendations are consensus-driven and actionable.

We hold as important tenets of our work that:

**Adoption of AI Bills of Rights/policies within member organizations can create mutual trust and benefits for all.**

And that

**Attention to AI Governance can improve the longevity and relevance of research environments and communities like EOSC and the Research Data Alliance.**

**Motivation:** The AI Bill of Rights team goal is to present recommendations to EOSC Future and Research Data Alliance on the needs for AI Governance/AI Bill of Rights in various jurisdictional, disciplinary and research scenarios taking into account the potential rights of data creators, model developers, model and data re-users, and citizens/communities/patients whose lives/privacy/wellbeing are impacted by AI and data sharing modalities.

Our team looks at how AI governance should shape what data is gathered and used in AI systems, what the rights of individual persons are inside this data, and how communities adopt and adapt to AI driven forms of decision making and creativity where ecological flourishing and human wellbeing are prioritized at the outset and throughout all design of any AI system as key metrics of societal and global prosperity and progress. It is our aim to inform an understanding of Inclusive AI Governance for EOSC constituencies and the RDA membership, as well as to encourage Civil Society Participation in Standards Development in AI to move beyond risk models in isolation to help shepherd AI systems to complement a flourishing future for all.

Recommendations for Review  
2024

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## 1 **Critical Tenets**

2 We hold as critical tenets of our work that:

3

4 **Adoption of AI Bills of Rights/ policies within member organizations will create mutual**  
5 **trust and benefits for all.**

6

7

And that

8

9 **Attention to AI Governance improves the longevity and relevance of research**  
10 **environments and communities like EOSC and the Research Data Alliance.**

## 11 **Introduction**

12 Allowing and encouraging a culture of data access through data visitation agreements for  
13 research, and to train models, can improve frequency of access to re-usable data sets and a  
14 better way of making machine actionable data use agreements. In the circumstance of creating  
15 or providing platforms for in silico trials and access to digital twins or “many worlds” for research  
16 purposes, certain rights can speed the progress of research or limit use of diagnostics,  
17 treatments/interventions, or forecasts created in such environments. Mutual data use  
18 agreements must therefore also take into consideration how other parties’ governance of and  
19 use of AI may use unconsented data to train models or be consumed and repurposed inside  
20 generative AI models. Bias exists in models and training datasets. Decision making based on  
21 such system outputs can cause personal and community harms as a consequence. Therefore,  
22 it is of importance for communities and research partners interacting with models to understand  
23 whether such models are running under jurisdictional or other governance requiring  
24 transparency (or permitting opacity and to what extent) and whether they are IEEE 7010-2020  
25 compliant<sup>1</sup>. Information provided in such governance scenarios should include how current a  
26 model’s training data is, the frequency with which models are retrained, what is the re-training  
27 periodicity(if-any), and which state, national or regional jurisdictional governance is assured for  
28 the models and/or training data used in deployed AI systems.

29

## 30 **Goal**

31 The AI Bill of Rights team goal is to present recommendations to EOSC Future and Research  
32 Data Alliance on the needs for AI Governance/AI Bill of Rights in various jurisdictional,  
33 disciplinary and research scenarios taking into account the potential rights of data creators,  
34 model developers, model and data re-users, and citizens/communities/patients whose  
35 lives/privacy/wellbeing are impacted by AI and data sharing modalities. Our team looks at how  
36 AI governance can shape what data is gathered and used in AI systems, what the rights of  
37 individual persons are inside this data, and how communities adopt and adapt to AI driven forms

38 of decision making and creativity. It is our aim to inform an understanding of Inclusive AI  
39 Governance for EOSC constituencies and the RDA membership, as well as to encourage Civil  
40 Society Participation in Standards Development in AI.

41  
42 There are many efforts underway in various jurisdictional and disciplinary communities to  
43 govern AI and create policy that ensures a climate of progress for AI driven implementations in  
44 business, industry and research while at the same time balancing the needs of impacted  
45 people's rights to privacy that keeps lives harm from bias/prejudice. Concerns and tensions  
46 abound as use of AI begins to challenge previous notions of what it means to be a rights holder,  
47 or a model creator/deployer, and what it means to know and understand what kind of data is  
48 used to train models. In turn this leads to questions about what kind of AI should/could be used  
49 to create art, diagnose and treat patients, educate students, write papers and code, influence  
50 politics, surveil municipal safety or regional immigration, just to name a handful of use cases.

### 51 **Relationship to other AIDV outputs/efforts**

52 These recommendations proposed by the EOSC Future/AIDV Working Group's Bill of Rights  
53 team are meant to be informed by and responsive to the concurrent outputs of AIDV WG team  
54 deliverables particularly the AIDV WG **Guidance on Informed Consent**<sup>2</sup>, and the AIDV WG  
55 **Guidance for Ethics Committees Reviewing AI and Data Visitation**<sup>3</sup>.

### 56 **Recommendations**

57 We recommend the below elements as essential to prioritize as parts of a Responsible AI<sup>4</sup>  
58 strategy for any group (organization, company, university, hospital, jurisdiction/community).

### 59 **Essential Elements**

- 60 1. AI & Acceptable Use Policies: Formalize the definition of AI in your community, document key  
61 roles and responsibilities related to AI, outline the acceptable and unacceptable uses of AI for  
62 your community.
- 63 2. AI Working Group (oversight committee): Form an oversight committee whose function it is to  
64 oversee AI systems, allocate resources, develop and maintain AI governance policies and  
65 procedures for your community.
- 66 3. AI Training and Education: Training and change management are integral to the successful  
67 operationalization of AI and AI policy. Offer learning opportunities on an Introduction to AI, on  
68 Ethical considerations for AI, as well as training on Development of AI strategy, Effective AI  
69 governance and Risk management, in addition to training on product/project management for  
70 how to run effective AI projects, and how to use technical tools in an AI  
71 landscape/cyberinfrastructure.
- 72 4. AI Impact Assessment
- 73 5. Ongoing Monitoring: Consider, will you have a Human in the loop, Human over the loop, Human  
74 out of the loop monitoring plan<sup>5</sup>?
- 75 6. Transparency, Notice & Disclosure
- 76 7. Vendor Due Diligence

- 77 8. Test AI systems for Bias: Identify different types of biases: Systemic, Human, Computational .  
78 Mitigating bias requires action at each stage of the AI lifecycle

## 79 Impact Assessment

80 Because it is essential to govern systems that can potentially cause certain harms and it is  
81 essential to assess the Impacts of AI Systems, we recommend the below Impact assessment  
82 elements<sup>6</sup> as essential to prioritize as parts of a responsible AI strategy for any group  
83 (organization, company, university, hospital, jurisdiction/community):

- 84 ● Determine what will be the AI system impact assessment process
- 85 ● Documentation of AI system impact assessments
- 86 ● Assessing AI System impact on individuals and groups of individuals
- 87 ● Assessing societal impacts of AI systems
- 88 ● AI system impact assessment process

## 89 AI Alignment

90 Any person or organization creating or adopting an AI policy needs to be able to discuss,  
91 understand and document what will be your strategy for AI Alignment. AI Alignment is an AI  
92 safety research/process that aims to ensure AI systems achieve desired outcomes. If you're  
93 creating or implementing an AI or AI policy you need to be able to define the system or policy's  
94 desired outcomes, and articulate how you'll document the processes for monitoring, measuring  
95 and logging where you achieve and fall short of achieving desired outcomes/benefits of AI or AI  
96 policy.

97  
98 Any group creating or implementing an AI or AI policy should<sup>7</sup>:

- 99
- 100 ● Consider auditable detection for bias. Bias detection exposes cases where decision logic is in  
101 violation of agreed upon ethics.
- 102 ● Consider auditable detection for privacy violations. Privacy leak detection exposes cases where  
103 decision logic is in violation of agreed upon ethics ensuring privacy.
- 104 ● Have a control and escalation process to assign responsibility for investigation, a process for  
105 investigation, a process for notification and disclosure of violations, and a process for  
106 reconciliation/restitution to impacted individuals and groups to mitigate and correct consequences  
107 of non-aligned AI

## 108 Recommendations for EOSC Future and Research Data Alliance

109 To reiterate, we hold as a critical tenet of our work that **Adoption of AI Bills of Rights/ policies**  
110 **within member organizations will create mutual trust and benefits for all**

111 And that

112 **Prioritization of AI Governance will improve the longevity and relevance of research**  
113 **environments and communities like EOSC and the Research Data Alliance.**

114

115 AI Governance can be approached from human rights, risk based, or safetybased motivations  
116 or a combination of all three. So far, most organizations and jurisdictions regulate artificial  
117 general intelligence based on the risks such models may give rise to during their development,  
118 deployment and dissemination. The 2023 State of AI Report mentions how “Amid the theoretical  
119 debate, labs are building in their own mitigations” and offers as examples how DeepMind’s  
120 “proposed toolkit and associated workflow for extending standard model evaluations” assesses  
121 “for potentially dangerous capabilities (e.g. cyber-offense, self-proliferation) and propensity to  
122 cause harm.” and how Anthropic’s “Responsible Scaling Policy, with a risk-based list of safety  
123 commitments” (internal access controls, red-teaming, third-party evaluations, and tiered access  
124 for different AI Safety Levels) builds in “development breaks if safety measures fail to keep up  
125 with capabilities”.<sup>8</sup>

126  
127 Yet, as Coglianesse argues, “risk-based regulation—like regulatory excellence more generally—  
128 is not a merely technical enterprise. It requires not only technical competence, but also  
129 principled decision-making, transparency, careful attention to empirical evidence and on-the-  
130 ground implementation”<sup>9</sup>. And, the application of AI raises fundamental questions regarding  
131 human rights. “At most, risk assessments inform regulators’ decisions; they do not provide a full  
132 basis for them . . . Risk assessment provides scientific or empirical answers about probabilities,  
133 hazards, and their distribution; it does not supply the policy principle or normative reason  
134 needed to make regulatory or risk management decisions about these hazards”<sup>10</sup>

135  
136 Organizations like RDA and EOSC Future have a remit to go beyond this risk-based rhetoric  
137 that dominates corporate AI Governance strategies. Thus, in contrast to an exclusively risk-  
138 based governance, we hereby recommend adoption of a “human-rights first” based approach to  
139 AI governance. Organizations like RDA, due to their open international membership, have a  
140 need to prioritize and accommodate the perspectives and disparities of and between developing  
141 countries alongside the needs of companies and countries at the forefront of AI development  
142 and adoption. By taking a human rights first approach to AI governance, members of the RDA  
143 community will hold not only our own work accountable for current and future generations, but  
144 also provide actionable guidance to those guiding and regulating this fast-moving field towards  
145 the future.

146  
147 Considering the increasing call for global coordination on A(G)I governance, we call on EOSC  
148 Future and RDA to take up leading roles in allying practitioners to center human-rights including  
149 the rights of model creators and deployers as core principles in AI and data governance,  
150 research, development, and deployment activities.

151  
152 **For the EOSC Future project** we recommend attention be paid to differentiating between  
153 persons as “model creators” separately from model deployers, or model users, and persons whose  
154 data is in training data sets, or persons who are impacted by 3rd party use of models for decision  
155 making. Bills of Rights and AI Governance recommendations tend to ignore, gloss over, or collapse  
156 treatment of the distinctive rights of model/AI creators and deployers. We call out the

157 importance of acknowledging how persons can (and likely will be) in one or many AI impacted  
158 classes over their lifetimes and careers. For example: as students, instructors, patients,  
159 customers, employees, employers, and citizens but also as model creator/deployers.

160

161 **For the EOSC Future project** we recommend in-depth and documented consideration of the  
162 circumstances and rights of instructors teaching AI development and deployment, students  
163 studying AI, model creators, deployers and re-users, data collectors, providers, and sharers as  
164 individuals, research groups, organizations, and companies alongside current definitions of  
165 impacted communities and individuals in AI policy in ways that acknowledge the rights and well  
166 being of those in the role of innovators/creators/implementers.

167

168 **For Research Data Alliance:** We acknowledge that RDA is well positioned to champion the  
169 primacy of protection of human rights in globally impactful AI Governance mechanisms. We  
170 recommend the membership and organization consider hosting and offering AI Governance  
171 learning opportunities and feedback sessions prior to introduction of any membership-wide  
172 attempt to develop an RDA specific organizational AI Bill of Rights. We recommend that the  
173 organization consider that in an organization like RDA with such an international membership it  
174 will be of paramount importance that members understand jurisdictional layering. RDA has a  
175 duty to honor and not to ignore differences and protections already granted to its individual  
176 members as citizens, residents, researchers, and students under the regional, national, state  
177 and municipal laws that may already govern its members where they live, work, and study.

## 178 Literature search

179 The AIDV-WG's research on emerging Jurisdictional and Special Interest AI Rights and  
180 Protections encompasses AI resources that intersect human rights, education, ethics,  
181 health/medicine, regulation/governance and risk. The AIDV WG's open, shared citation library,<sup>11</sup>  
182 explores emerging and codified rights for AI/LLM/Model creators, deployers, and harmed/  
183 impacted parties at the International, Regional, National, and Municipal levels and disciplinary  
184 scenarios.

185



186  
187 Figure 1 Shared Citation Library

-credit AIDV-WG

188  
189 We have categorized these resources by whether they relate to the categories of: “Disciplinary  
190 or Special Interest Rights and Protections”, Education, Ethics, “Healthcare and Medicine”,  
191 “Generative AI Publishing/Authorship and Copyright”, “Informed Consent”, “Jurisdictional Rights  
192 Declarations and Acts”, Legal, “Privacy and Surveillance”, Risks, and “Related News Stories”.  
193 The assets in our shared library are tagged by country and jurisdiction where relevant.  
194

## 195 AI Risk dominates the conversation

196  
197 The risks posed by Artificial Intelligence (AI) can easily dominate policy priorities, AI conversations,  
198 press coverage, and AI governance spending. MIT Future Tech’s AI Risk Repository, at the time of  
199 this report, is a live, open database of ~777 risks extracted from 43 taxonomies with an  
200 accompanying taxonomy and preprint<sup>12</sup>. There is a proliferation of model management tools to aid  
201 model deployers in AI Governance and risk management tasks and a burgeoning ecosystem of  
202 responsible AI startups.<sup>13,14</sup>  
203




Figure 2 EAIDB Responsible AI Startup Ecosystem credit <https://www.eaidb.org/map>.

204  
205  
206

207 **The landscape of Jurisdictional AI Policy**

208 Below, arising from our literature search and team research effort, we summarize global,  
209 international, regional, country, municipal level, disciplinary and special interest policies and foci  
210 for the benefit of the EOSC Future project and the Research Data Alliance community.

211 **UNESCO: Recommendations on AI Ethics**

212 On 23 November, 2021, after three years of preparations, UNESCO adopted the  
213 Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, first-ever comprehensive UN guidelines

214 for AI<sup>15</sup>, which were adopted by 193 countries<sup>16</sup>. All Member states of the UNESCO adopted the  
215 recommendations that define common values and principles needed to ensure the healthy  
216 development of AI. Signatories agree that Member States are to:

217 “apply on a voluntary basis the provisions of this Recommendation by taking  
218 appropriate steps, including whatever legislative or other measures may be required, in  
219 conformity with the constitutional practice and governing structures of each State, to give  
220 effect within their jurisdictions to the principles and norms of the Recommendation in  
221 conformity with international law, including international human rights law” and that “  
222 Member States engage all stakeholders, including business enterprises, to ensure that  
223 they play their respective roles in the implementation of this Recommendation; and bring  
224 the Recommendation to the attention of the authorities, bodies, research and academic  
225 organizations, institutions and organizations in public, private and civil society sectors  
226 involved in AI technologies, so that the development and use of AI technologies are  
227 guided by both sound scientific research as well as ethical analysis and evaluation.”

228  
229 adopted a landmark resolution on the promotion of “safe, secure and trustworthy” AI systems  
230 that will also benefit sustainable development for all. The resolution calls on the Member States  
231 to refrain from using AI systems that cannot comply with international human rights law, and  
232 ensure that people’s rights online are protected the same way as they are offline. The resolution  
233 emphasized protection of personal data, monitoring of AI risks, and the need to close the digital  
234 divide.

235  
236  
237 The Group of Friends of the Implementation of the Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial  
238 Intelligence was launched on 3 February 2022 as an informal and open-ended network of  
239 Member States. The Group of Friends meets regularly to support UNESCO’s work on  
240 implementation and to create a space to share experiences and good practices for the full  
241 implementation of the Recommendation. At their first meeting they also stressed “the  
242 importance of including in this Group of Friends external stakeholders including the private  
243 sector, academics and others, on a needs basis”.

## 244 Regional, country and municipal level policies and foci

245 Several regional and country level AI governance commonalities and differences can be seen in  
246 examples from the OECD, China, Africa, Nigeria, the Middle East and North Africa region,  
247 Israel, The European Union, the Council on Europe, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United  
248 States, California, New York City, Canada, Latin America, Australia, and Taiwan. Below we  
249 offer brief overviews of some noteworthy components of these.

250 OECD: “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI”


251 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) AI Principles are  
252 among the first such principles signed up to by governments. They promote AI that is  
253 innovative and trustworthy and that respects human rights and democratic values. They were  
254 adopted in May 2019 by OECD member countries when they approved the [OECD Council](#)  
255 [Recommendation on Artificial Intelligence](#). They include concrete recommendations for public  
256 policy and strategy, and their general scope ensures they can be applied to AI developments  
257 around the world. The principles interpret fairness through the lenses of equal access, inclusive  
258 design processes, and equal treatment: diversity, nondiscrimination, fairness, inclusion –  
259 throughout the entire AI system’s life cycle.

260

261 The OECD guidelines for ethical AI – promote seven governance principles: (1) human agency  
262 and oversight, (2) technical robustness and safety, (3) privacy and data governance, (4)  
263 transparency, (5) diversity, nondiscrimination and fairness, (6) environmental and societal well-  
264 being, and (7) accountability.

265

**Governments that have Committed to the AI Principles**



266

267 Figure 3 “Governments that have Committed to the AI Principles” © 2023 OECD. All rights reserved  
268

269 Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI)

270 GPAI<sup>17</sup>, organized in 2020 around a shared commitment to the above OECD *Recommendation*  
271 *on Artificial Intelligence*, brings together experts from science, industry, civil society,

272 governments, international organisations and academia to foster international cooperation  
273 related to AI and convenes working groups on both Data Governance and Responsible AI.

274 GPAI's **Working Group on Data Governance**<sup>18</sup> collates evidence, shapes research,  
275 undertakes applied AI projects and provides expertise on data governance, to promote data for  
276 AI being collected, used, shared, archived and deleted in ways that are consistent with human  
277 rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation, economic growth, and societal benefit, while seeking to  
278 address the UN Sustainable Development Goals. This group has released numerous outputs  
279 toward these ends, including "**Data Justice in Practice: A Guide for Policymakers**<sup>19</sup> and a  
280 companion **Data Justice in Practice: A Guide for Impacted Communities**<sup>20</sup>.

281 The GPAI **Responsible AI Working Group**<sup>21</sup> is grounded in a vision of AI that is human-  
282 centred, fair, equitable, inclusive and respectful of human rights and democracy, and that aims  
283 at contributing positively to the public good. The GPAI countries have put climate action and  
284 biodiversity preservation at the top of their agenda, positing that as a general-purpose  
285 technology, AI can be harnessed responsibly to accelerate positive environmental action. In  
286 2021 the WG released an action-oriented set of recommendations entitled **CLIMATE CHANGE**  
287 **AND AI: Recommendations for Government Action** to guide policy makers developing AI  
288 related climate action strategies<sup>22</sup>.

289  
290 In 2022, the GPAI Responsible AI Working Group and Project RAISE (Responsible AI Strategy for  
291 the Environment)<sup>23</sup> began to implement some of the recommendations of the WG's AI & climate  
292 roadmap by assessing the environmental impacts of AI compute and preparing AI readiness  
293 booklets for key industries to achieve net-zero. The scope was later expanded to start building a  
294 roadmap on AI and biodiversity preservation. Three WG deliverables produced within this mandate  
295 include:

- 296 1. **The AI Footprint: Measuring the environmental impacts of AI Compute and Applications**<sup>24</sup>,  
297 a guide drafted in consultation with RAI experts and the OECD.AI Expert Group on AI Compute  
298 and Climate. This report provides actionable information for policymakers who wish to implement  
299 the principles and priorities of data justice in their policymaking activities.
- 300 2. AI for Net Zero electricity<sup>25</sup>
- 301 3. Biodiversity and AI: Opportunities and Recommendations for Action<sup>26</sup>

## 302 Regulation on AI in China: A brief overview

303 Ethical governance of artificial intelligence (AI) has been integrated in China's 'new generation  
304 artificial intelligence development plan' since 2017<sup>27</sup>. The effort to develop guiding ethical  
305 principles and standards has also been integrated into China's recent and wider efforts to  
306 develop ethical governance of science and technology since late 2018. Since AI is an  
307 interdisciplinary and intersectoral field that involves the scientific and industry communities and  
308 concerns the public at large, multiple agencies are involved in overseeing the development of  
309 standards for ethical governance of the research, development and deployment of AI in China.  
310 Leading agencies include and not limited to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology

311 (MIIT), the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the Cyberspace Administration of  
312 China (CAC) and the State Administration for Market Regulation.

313  
314 Even though at the national level, no law has yet been made specifically on AI, the policy makers  
315 have paid great attention on regulating data security, protecting personal information, and  
316 regulating the cyberspace. For instance, the Data Security Law of People's Republic of China<sup>28</sup>,  
317 and the Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China<sup>29</sup> were released  
318 and put into effect in the year of 2021. A White Paper that summarizes the Chinese approach in  
319 regulating the cyberspace was recently published by the State Council Information Office<sup>30</sup>.

320  
321 A series of efforts have been made to steer ethical governance of AI development at the national  
322 level in China by entities such as the Expert Committee for Ethical Governance of the Next  
323 Generation AI and National Informational Security Standardisation Technical Committee. These  
324 efforts have led to the publication of *the Governance Principles for a New Generation of Artificial*  
325 *Intelligence: Develop Responsible Artificial Intelligence* in 2021<sup>31</sup>. Eight guiding principles are 1)  
326 harmony and friendliness, 2) fairness and justice, 3) inclusiveness and sharing, 4) respect for  
327 privacy, 5) security and controllability, 6) shared responsibility, 7) open cooperation and 8) agile  
328 governance. Standards have also been developed in both key technical areas and in ethical  
329 terms, such as guidelines for prevention of ethical & security risks of artificial intelligence in  
330 2021<sup>32</sup> and guidelines for the standardisation of artificial intelligence ethical governance in 2023<sup>33</sup>.

331  
332 Notably, China has taken a proactive approach in regulating generative AI. In November 2022,  
333 the CAC, the MITT and the Ministry of Public Security jointly issued the *Administrative Provisions*  
334 *on Deep Synthesis in Internet-Based Information Services* that were put into effect on 1 January  
335 2023<sup>34</sup>. In response to the rising popularity and elicited concern on generative AI, on 11 April  
336 2023, the CAC released a draft regulation on the use of generative AI for public consultation<sup>35</sup>  
337 and seven governmental agencies have subsequently jointly issued the regulation in July.

338  
339 Lastly, at the municipal level, Shenzhen and Shanghai have developed policies to steer the  
340 development of AI industries in responsible manners within their jurisdiction<sup>36</sup>. Given the  
341 widespread interest in developing AI industries around China, it is likely other provinces and/or  
342 cities will follow suit. And at the international level, it is worth noticing that, not only China has  
343 endorsed WHO's *Ethics & Governance of Artificial Intelligence for Health* (2021)<sup>37</sup> and UNESCO's  
344 *Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence* (2022)<sup>38</sup>, but it has also begun to actively  
345 promote dialogue and cooperation on the governance of AI. In late 2022, the Ministry of Foreign  
346 Affairs issued the *Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on Strengthening Ethical*  
347 *Governance of Artificial Intelligence*, stating that 'China is committed to building a community with  
348 a shared future for mankind in the domain of AI, advocating a people-centered approach and the  
349 principle of *AI for good*'<sup>39</sup>. The ethos is echoed in the aforementioned white paper that was  
350 published by the State Council Information Office this year.

351

352 In recent years, China has made considerable efforts to steer ethical development of AI  
353 research, innovation and related industries. Even though there is yet no overarching law on AI,  
354 with China's proactive approach in regulating AI, the ethical and regulatory framework it has  
355 established is to large extent able to cover the evolving fields of AI research, development and  
356 deployment and to agilely respond to emerging challenges. More importantly, the ethical  
357 principles China have adopted are not that distinctive from other countries and regions, and the  
358 Chinese government has shown great interest in promoting collaboration in developing  
359 international guidance and standards on ethical AI in line with its commitment to building a  
360 community with a shared future for mankind.

361 Taiwan

362 Tawan initiated the "AI Action Plan" in 2018 with the aim to prosper AI development and to build  
363 solid digital infrastructure. The government is drafting an act to govern artificial intelligence (AI)  
364 and expects to have it ready for the legislature in September 2023. The National Science and  
365 Technology Council (NSTC) announced the draft act will cover the legal definition of AI, privacy  
366 protections, data governance, risk controls and ethical principles related to AI<sup>40</sup>.

367 Africa

368 The Forum on Artificial Intelligence in Africa gathered in Benguéir (Kingdom of Morocco) on 12  
369 and 13 December 2018, to reflect and debate on the different dimensions of AI within the  
370 African context<sup>41</sup>. Later, in 2019 the African Union (AU) established a working group on Artificial  
371 Intelligence with a mandate to study the creation of a common African stance on AI, the  
372 development of an Africa-wide capacity-building framework, and to establish an AI think tank to  
373 assess and recommend projects to collaborate on in line with the AU's Agenda 2063 and the  
374 United Nations ("UN") Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). *Responsible AI in Africa:  
375 Challenges and Opportunities* (2023) is an open access collection edited by Damian Okaibedi  
376 Eke, Kutoma Wakunuma, and Simisola Akintoye<sup>42</sup> that offers a good overview of regional  
377 progress and challenges. In the forward, Mark Coeckelbergh calls the reader's attention to the  
378 responsibility to study when and where "tech innovation and use of digital technologies actually  
379 works in African contexts, including cases in which that might already be responsible." He  
380 extolls how:

381  
382 There are examples of good strategies, inside and outside Africa. Ethics should not only  
383 be about what could go wrong, but also about what already goes right and why, and  
384 about how we can shape a good common future. These comments also raise the  
385 question: who should develop responsible AI in Africa? The answer must be: in the first  
386 place Africans themselves. Neocolonialism is game over, and AI ethics should not be the  
387 place to perpetuate or renew it. Unfortunately, as Stahl et al. remind us in this volume, AI  
388 strategies are often dominated by powerful global actors. Such structural problems need  
389 to be addressed<sup>43</sup>. Yet it should not be an excuse to refrain from developing one's own  
390 policy ecosystem with regard to AI and similar technologies. This is about creating

391 opportunities for responsible innovation. This is about harnessing the benefits of AI for  
392 citizens. This is about taking responsibility for one's own technological future.

393

394 Some examples of organizations in Africa emerging to offer AI services, training, research are:  
395 Ai Kenya formed in 2017, a community aimed at bringing together like-minded people to  
396 discuss, build and grow the Artificial Intelligence and Data Science ecosystem in Kenya and  
397 East Africa. As well as: The Machine Intelligence Institute of Africa (MIIA)<sup>44</sup>, an African non-  
398 profit organization founded by Dr. Jacques Ludik in 2016 and the AI Centre of Excellence Africa  
399 (AICE), founded in 2020. In 2021 an AI Blueprint<sup>45</sup> project was led by the Republic of South  
400 Africa, and the Smart Africa Secretariat (SAS) with contributions from the AU, The Republic of  
401 Rwanda and Uganda and many others to together craft a plan that would guide African  
402 member-states towards developing policies, strategies and plans that would ensure growth and  
403 prosperity within the digital revolution space. There is a section within the AI Blueprint which  
404 guides the member-states on what they could or should implement around the matters requiring  
405 AI intervention as a technology of choice. Since then several African countries have established  
406 groups and initiatives to govern AI. Nigeria's progress is described below, followed by a  
407 summary of six countries in Northern Africa.

408 Nigeria makes progress on Comprehensive AI Policy / Regulatory Framework

409 Nigeria has been actively developing its AI policy in recent years, with a focus on using AI to drive  
410 economic growth, enhance national security, and address social challenges. This builds on the  
411 groundwork laid when the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA)<sup>46</sup> was  
412 established in April 2001 following the Federal Executive Council's (FEC) approval of the Nigerian  
413 National IT Policy. A subsequent responsibility was to implement the Nigerian Information  
414 Technology Policy and coordinate general IT development in Nigeria.

415 The NITDA Act (2007)<sup>47</sup> mandates creating a framework for the planning, research, development,  
416 standardization, application, coordination, monitoring, evaluation and regulation of Information  
417 Technology practices, activities and systems in Nigeria.

418 The role

- 419
- 420 ● Is to develop, regulate and advise on Information technology in the country through  
regulatory standards, guidelines and policies.
  - 421 ● NITDA is the clearing house for all IT projects and infrastructural development in the  
422 country.
  - 423 ● It is the prime Agency for e-government implementation, Internet governance and general  
424 IT development in Nigeria.

425 The various arms of NITDA related to AI now engage with:

- 426
- The National Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (NCAIR)<sup>48</sup>

- 427       • The National Digital Economy Policy and Strategy (NDEPS)<sup>49</sup>  
428       • Artificial Intelligence Centre of Excellence Africa (AICE)<sup>50</sup> in partnership with the  
429       Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

430 In November 2019, the Nigerian government launched the National Centre for Artificial  
431 Intelligence and Robotics (NCAIR) as part of its efforts to develop an AI ecosystem in the country  
432 (<https://ncair.nitda.gov.ng/>).

433 The NCAIR is a collaborative effort between the government, academia, and industry. It **aims** to  
434 promote the development and deployment of AI and robotics technologies in Nigeria. Its  
435 **objectives** include fostering research and development in AI and robotics, developing AI and  
436 robotics talent, and promoting the use of AI and robotics to solve national challenges.

437 With the advent of the National Digital Economy Policy and Strategy (NDEPS), which was formally  
438 unveiled by the immediate past government on 28th November 2019, it became necessary for  
439 the Agency to chart a new vision for itself. The implementation of the NDEPS has also required  
440 that the Agency creates a new department designated as the Department of digital economy, to  
441 be dedicated fully to the implementation of the policy.

442 NITDA has drafted guidelines for ethical AI deployment and issued policies for data protection to  
443 provide guidance to businesses and organizations on responsible AI use. The guidelines outline  
444 principles such as fairness, transparency, and accountability. The aim is to ensure that AI  
445 deployment is done in a manner that is consistent with human rights and ethical principles.  
446 Furthermore, the government of Nigeria has established an AI centre of excellence in partnership  
447 with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to support the development of AI skills and  
448 talent in the country.

449 **Challenges to be addressed** by the guidelines are the need for infrastructure investment, and  
450 skills development to support AI research and development.

451 NITDA has published several instruments and monitors their compliance with the development of  
452 information technology in Nigeria. The instruments serve as a minimum benchmark in the  
453 development and implementation of information technology in Nigeria and are enforceable by law.

- 454       • [NDPR Implementation Framework<sup>51</sup> \[ Download \]](#)
- 455       • [Guidelines for The Management of Personal Data By Public Institutions In Nigeria, 2020<sup>52</sup>](#)  
456       [\[ Download \]](#)
- 457       • [Guidelines for Nigerian Content Development in Information and Communication](#)  
458       [Technology \(ICT\)<sup>53</sup> \[ Download \]](#)
- 459       • [Framework and Guidelines for Public Internet Access<sup>54</sup> \[ Download \]](#)
- 460       • [Guidelines for Clearance of Information Technology \(IT\) Project by Public Institutions<sup>55</sup> \[](#)  
461       [Download \]](#)

- 462 ● Guidelines for Registration of ICT Service Providers/Contractors for Delivery of It Services  
463 to MDAs<sup>56</sup> [ Download ]
- 464 ● Nigeria e-Government Interoperability Framework (Ne-GIF)<sup>57</sup> [ Download ]
- 465 ● Framework and Guidelines for Information and Communication Technology (ICT)  
466 Adoption in Tertiary Institutions<sup>58</sup> [ Download ]
- 467 ● Framework and Guidelines for the Use of Social Media Platforms in Public Institutions<sup>59</sup> [  
468 Download ]
- 469 ● Nigerian Government Enterprise Architecture [ Download ]

470 Nigeria Federal government's has finalized the AI policy but it is yet to be released  
471 <https://sciencenigeria.com/fg-finalises-policy-on-ai-commends-volunteers-for-contributions/>

472 At present, Nigeria Federal government has finalized its AI policy but it is yet to be released  
473 <https://sciencenigeria.com/fg-finalises-policy-on-ai-commends-volunteers-for-contributions/>. In  
474 the meantime, the Nigerian Communications Commission has released a Study on the *Ethical*  
475 *And Societal Impact Of Artificial Intelligence (Ai)*<sup>60</sup> to "pave a way for future studies on AI and  
476 provide the Nigerian Communications Commissions with informed recommendations of  
477 measures that would see to the safe and ethical deployment and regulation of AI in Nigeria". The  
478 study focuses on answering the following research questions:

- 479 1. How does AI impact the society?
- 480 2. What are the ethical considerations related to AI?
- 481 3. Can AI be regulated? If so, how?

482 North Africa

483 Existing North-African AI strategies are released for the countries of Algeria, Egypt and  
484 Tunisia<sup>61</sup>.

485

**Table 1** Overview of existing North-African AI strategies

| <i>Country</i> | <i>Title of AI strategy document</i>  | <i>Status</i> | <i>Policy areas/priority segments or sectors</i>  | <i>Regulatory/ethical considerations</i>  |
|----------------|---|---------------|---|---|
| Algeria        | The national strategy of research and innovation on Artificial Intelligence (2020–2030) | Completed     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Higher education</li> <li>– Health</li> <li>– Energy</li> <li>– Technologies</li> </ul>  |   |
| Egypt          | National AI Strategy  | Completed     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Agriculture/environment and water management</li> <li>– Healthcare</li> <li>– Natural Language Processing</li> <li>– Economic planning</li> <li>– Manufacturing and infrastructure management</li> </ul> | Track and monitor implementation of strategy, laws and regulations, ethical principles and guidelines |
| Tunisia        | National Artificial Intelligence Strategy   | In progress   |   | Sustainable, equitable development, and ethical challenges  |

Table 1

credit

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488  
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In North Africa, comprising Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Sudan, almost all the countries in the region have already instituted processes of framing policies to ensure safe deployment, harness economic potentials and ensure ethical use of AI(Ibid).

For example, Algeria presented its National Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2020–2030 on the 18th of January, 2021, to “improve Algerian skills in the field of AI through education, training and research, on the one hand, and strengthen these capacities as a development tool allowing socio-economic sectors to iron out the obstacles hindering the digital transition underway, on the other hand” (“Strategy for research in artificial intelligence launched” 2021). Tunisia also joined the race by creating a Task Force to “devise a methodology and an action plan to produce the country’s National AI Strategy (Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique 2018). In crafting its national strategy, the Egyptian government formed the National Council for AI “as a partnership between the governmental institutions, prominent academics and practitioners from leading businesses in the field of AI” with a responsibility amongst others, to “identify AI applications that provide smart, safe and sustainable solutions and services”. The country expects to “track and monitor the implementation of the strategy, laws and regulations, ethical principles and guidelines” (MCIT 2020).

507 Riyadh AI Call for Action Declaration (RAICA) Digital Cooperation  
508 Organization(DCO)

509 The DCO brings together the Ministries of Communications and IT of sixteen nations – Bahrain,  
510 Bangladesh, The Republic of Cyprus, Djibouti, The Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Jordan, Kuwait,  
511 Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Rwanda, and Saudi Arabia. Following a Ministerial  
512 roundtable at the Global AI Summit 2022, member states of the Digital Cooperation  
513 Organization (DCO) agreed to adopt the Riyadh AI Call for Action Declaration (RAICA)<sup>62</sup>, which  
514 seeks to use AI technology to benefit people, communities, nations, and the world as a whole.  
515 The declaration was signed by all members of DCO.

516  
517  
518 As AI technology continues to advance and become embedded in every aspect of daily  
519 life, it becomes increasingly necessary for leaders to ensure that it is utilized solely to  
520 benefit people, communities, nations, and the planet.

521  
522 The Riyadh AI Call for Action Declaration advances this commitment to identify and  
523 address present, emerging, and future humanitarian issues in the field of AI and highlight  
524 ways to use AI as a tool to benefit lives around the world, improve the quality of work,  
525 better design public policies, and bring efficiency into the ecosystem.

526  
527 This is to be achieved through seven key pillars, each comprising principles that address  
528 methods to ensure that all enjoy the benefits of AI and the harm is felt by none. To  
529 advance this goal, each principle is built upon one overarching objective, which serves  
530 as the foundation of this Declaration: AI FOR THE GOOD OF HUMANITY.

531

532 India

533  
534 The Indian government plans to release a draft regulatory framework for Artificial Intelligence  
535 (AI) by mid-year, aimed at promoting economic growth while addressing risks. This initiative,  
536 announced at the Nasscom Leadership Summit, also includes efforts to develop AI skills among  
537 individuals and to establish global governance for AI safety and trust.

538

539 Israel

540 In Israel, despite the publication of several plans related to AI over the last decade, developed  
541 by multi-participant expert committees, their implementation has mostly been delayed due to  
542 political instability<sup>63</sup>.

543 A few noteworthy exceptions include: C4IR NETWORK, The Israeli hub of the WEF C4IR  
544 network, advancing smart regulation for emerging technologies such as AI and blockchain,  
545 through collaboration with government regulators and the tech industry in Israel. The AI  
546 Strategy Governmental Team: This cross-governmental team was set up in 2020 to devise  
547 recommendations for a policy plan to promote AI R&I activities in Israel.

548 The most recent draft<sup>64</sup> was open for public consultation, by the previous government. However,  
549 the current Prime Minister has recently recommenced on preparing a new national policy for  
550 generative AI. The prime minister made comments about AI regulation in a recent interview  
551 where he made clear his lack of trust in success for global governance of AI in part because of  
552 the need for every country to competitively enter AI full force.<sup>65</sup>

553 As of today, Israel's regulation of research data in academia follows the European regulatory  
554 framework, mainly the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Related documents: Tel  
555 Aviv University complies with the GDPR (document in Hebrew)<sup>66</sup>.

## 556 European Union (EU)

### 557 The EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

558 The GDPR (2016/679) [Regulation in EU law on data protection](#) and privacy<sup>67</sup> is an important  
559 component of EU privacy law and of human rights law, building on Articles 7 and 8 of the EU  
560 Charter of Fundamental Rights, recognising respect for private life and protection of personal  
561 data as closely related but separate fundamental rights<sup>68</sup>. It also addresses the transfer of  
562 personal data outside the EU and EEA areas. GDPR does not limit research objectives, as long  
563 as the objectives are defined – and accordingly, define fair and transparent data collection and  
564 processing.

565 The GDPR notably sets two guiding principles:

- 566 • “Privacy by Default” principle prioritizes the alternative that better protects privacy;
- 567 • “Privacy by Design” principle precedes the implementation of privacy considerations to
- 568 the initial stage of system design and research plan.

569 These two principles are summarized into the **data minimization** guideline, “collect the  
570 minimum amount of personal data you need”. Both principles rely on the implementation of a  
571 risk analysis from the data controller, on the setting up of technical and organisational measures  
572 adapted to the field, to the processing characteristics, purposes and technological environment  
573 in which it is taking place. The objectives being to ensure data subject's rights and personal  
574 data protection throughout the processing in compliance with GDPR and to conceive privacy-  
575 preserving technologies as enablers. For an further analysis of the changes brought by this  
576 regulation in the EU, we refer readers to: The impact of the EU general data protection

577 regulation on scientific research(Chassang, 2017)<sup>69</sup> and to the *Guidelines 4/2019 on Article 25*  
578 *Data Protection by Design and by Default*<sup>70</sup>.

579 **GDPR Data sharing across countries**

580 The GDPR restricts data transfer from EU countries; and prohibits its transfer to a country that  
581 does not maintain an adequate level of personal information protection. Data sharing among  
582 researchers and research centers established in different EU member States of the EU  
583 countries is allowed, but data transfer outside the borders of those countries is subject to  
584 additional conditions for ensuring compliance with the EU regulations (see Chapter V GDPR). One of  
585 the mechanisms planned for allowing such data transfers consists in the recognition of the third  
586 country as ensuring an adequate level of personal data protection (via a European Commission's  
587 adequacy decision) as complying with the European regulations.

588 As of autumn 2023, the European Commission has so far recognised [Andorra](#), [Argentina](#),  
589 [Canada](#) (commercial organisations), [Faroe Islands](#), [Guernsey](#), [Israel](#), [Isle of Man](#), [Japan](#),  
590 [Jersey](#), [New Zealand](#), [Republic of Korea](#), [Switzerland](#) , the United Kingdom under the [GDPR](#)  
591 and the [LED](#), the United States (commercial organisations participating in the EU-US Data  
592 Privacy Framework) and [Uruguay](#) as providing adequate protection<sup>71</sup>.

593 With the exception of the United Kingdom, these adequacy decisions do not cover data  
594 exchanges in the law enforcement sector which are governed by the Law Enforcement Directive  
595 (Article 36 of [Directive \(EU\) 2016/680](#))<sup>72</sup>.

596 **The European Data Governance Act (DGA) and Proposed Data Governance Act**

597 DGA (November 2020 ) is across-sectoral instrument aiming to make more data available by  
598 regulating the re-use of publicly/held, protected data, by boosting data sharing through the  
599 regulation of novel data intermediaries and by encouraging the sharing of data for altruistic  
600 purposes. Both personal and non-personal data are in scope of the DGA, and wherever  
601 personal data is concerned, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies.

602 The Data Act (proposed Feb 2022)

603 complements the [Data Governance Act](#) of November 2020 by clarifying who can create value  
604 from data under which conditions. It includes:

- 605 ● Measures that enable users of connected devices to access the data generated by these  
606 devices and related services
- 607 ● Measures to provide protection from unfair contractual terms that are unilaterally  
608 imposed
- 609 ● Mechanisms for public sector bodies to access and use data held by the private sector
- 610 ● New rules that grant customers the freedom to switch between various cloud data-  
611 processing service providers
- 612 ● Measures to promote the development of interoperability standards

613 The Data Act's aim is to give both individuals and businesses more control over their data  
614 through a reinforced portability right, enabling copying or transferring data easily from across  
615 different services, where the data are generated through smart objects, machines, and devices.  
616 Uses by connected products using AI are ostensibly a case covered by the Data Act.  
617


## 618 Italy

619 In February 2023 the Italian Data Protection Authority (Garante per la protezione dei dati  
620 personali) banned AI Replika on the basis that it presented a risk to minors and to those  
621 considered emotionally fragile.<sup>73</sup> At the end of March 2023 Garante then imposed an immediate  
622 temporary limitation on the processing of Italian users' data by OpenAI/ChatGPT.<sup>74,75,76</sup> In the  
623 case of OpenAI, the action was prompted by a data breach related to ChatGPT conversations  
624 and payments and several concerns arose, including that: 1)no information was being made  
625 available to users and data subjects whose data are being collected by Open AI; 2)lack of legal  
626 basis underpinning the massive collection and processing of personal data in order to 'train' the  
627 algorithms on which the ChatGPT platform relies. 3)Concern over how information made  
628 available by ChatGPT does not always match factual circumstances, so that inaccurate  
629 personal data can be and are processed. 4)Lack of age verification mechanism allows use by  
630 minors and may expose children to receiving responses that are absolutely inappropriate to  
631 their age and awareness. By April 2023 Italy had lifted it's ChatGPT ban and the service was  
632 once again online in Italy<sup>77</sup> The ChatGPT privacy policy was now accessible to people before  
633 they registered and there was a new tool to verify the age of users and OpenAI had explained  
634 that it would also provide a new form for European Union users to exercise their right to object  
635 to its use of personal data to train its models. An Italian Garante Spokesperson said they would  
636 be planning and conducting an information campaign to inform Italians of what happened as  
637 well as of their right to opt-out from the processing of their personal data for training algorithms."

## 638 AI Act (aka EU AIA)<sup>78</sup>

639 The EU acknowledges that "the use of AI, with its specific characteristics (e.g. opacity,  
640 complexity, dependency on data, autonomous behaviour), can adversely affect a number of  
641 fundamental rights and users' safety".The European Union's AI Act lays the  
642 foundations for the regulation of AI in the EU. The EU AI Act is now finalized and  
643 published on 13 July 2024: [Regulation - EU - 2024/1689 - EN - EUR-Lex \(europa.eu\)](#) It comes  
644 into force on 1 August 2024. The AI Act Explorer also contains the [Artificial Intelligence Act,  
645 Official Journal version of 13 June 2024](#) and enables users to explore the contents of the Act or  
646 search for parts that are most relevant to them. Priorities for the act are to "make sure that AI  
647 systems used in the EU are safe, transparent, traceable, non-discriminatory and  
648 environmentally friendly" and that "AI systems should be overseen by people, rather than by  
649 automation, to prevent harmful outcomes"<sup>79</sup>.  
650

651  
652 In general, the rules establish obligations for providers and users depending on the level of risk  
653 from artificial intelligence. AI applications would be regulated only as strictly necessary to  
654 address specific levels of risk whereby legal intervention is tailored to concrete level of risk. The  
655 draft AI act distinguishes between AI systems posing (i) unacceptable risk, (ii) high risk, (iii)  
656 limited risk, and (iv) low or minimal risk.  
657



658  
659 Figure 4 *Pyramid of Risks*. Edwards. (2022). Ada Lovelace Institute. CC-BY-4.0  
660

661 AI Systems considered a threat to people will be banned and characterized as “Unacceptable  
662 Risk” AI systems. They include:

- 663 • Cognitive behavioural manipulation of people or specific vulnerable groups: for example  
664 voice-activated toys that encourage dangerous behaviour in children
- 665 • Social scoring: classifying people based on behaviour, socio-economic status or  
666 personal characteristics
- 667 • Real-time and remote biometric identification systems, such as facial recognition  
668

669 AI systems that negatively affect safety or fundamental rights will be characterized as “High  
670 Risk”. High-risk AI systems will be assessed before being put on the market and also  
671 throughout their lifecycle and will be divided into two categories:  
672

673 1) AI systems that are used in products falling under the EU’s product safety legislation<sup>80</sup>. This  
674 includes toys, aviation, cars, medical devices and lifts.

675 2) AI systems falling into eight specific areas that will have to be registered in an EU database:

- 676 1. Biometric identification and categorisation of natural persons

- 677 2. Management and operation of critical infrastructure
- 678 3. Education and vocational training
- 679 4. Employment, worker management and access to self-employment
- 680 5. Access to and enjoyment of essential private services and public services and benefits
- 681 6. Law enforcement
- 682 7. Migration, asylum and border control management
- 683 8. Assistance in legal interpretation and application of the law.
- 684

685 Under the EU AI Act, Generative AI, like ChatGPT, must comply with transparency  
686 requirements:

- 687 • Disclosing that the content was generated by AI
- 688 • Designing the model to prevent it from generating illegal content
- 689 • Publishing summaries of copyrighted data used for training
- 690

691 Limited risk AI systems will be required to comply with minimal transparency requirements that  
692 would allow users to make informed decisions. After interacting with the applications, the user  
693 can then decide whether they want to continue using it. Users should be made aware when they  
694 are interacting with AI. This includes AI systems that generate or manipulate image, audio or  
695 video content, for example deepfakes.

696 The AIA allows the free use of minimal-risk AI. This includes applications such as AI-enabled  
697 video games or spam filters. The vast majority of AI systems currently used in the EU fall into  
698 this category.

699  
700 Responses to the AIA before its adoption were varied and numerous. Some common concerns  
701 were voiced in The Civil Society Statement for Fundamental rights in EU AI Act and issued in  
702 Nov 2021 by European Digital Rights (EDRi) and 119 civil society organisations<sup>81</sup> who bring to  
703 attention that:

704 “In Europe, we have already witnessed the negative impact of AI when governed  
705 incorrectly. For example, discriminative AI uses at the border have facilitated the  
706 deportation of people on the move and denied them access to vital services such as  
707 health-care and social security. We have also seen how the use of predictive policing  
708 systems has led to increased over-policing of racialised communities, and how poor,  
709 working-class and migrant areas are being wrongfully targetted by fraud detection  
710 systems. The use of facial recognition and similar systems have been used across  
711 Europe in ways that lead to biometric mass surveillance.

712 By fostering mass surveillance and amplifying some of the deepest societal inequalities  
713 and power imbalances, AI systems are putting our fundamental rights and democratic  
714 processes and values at great risk. That is why the European Union (EU) institutions’  
715 proposal for an AIA is a globally significant step. But the AIA must address the structural,

716 societal, political and economic impacts of the use of AI. This will ensure that the law is  
717 future-proof, and prioritises the protection of fundamental rights.”

718 The Civil Society Statement for Fundamental rights in EU AI Act also emphasizes importance to  
719 govern the development and use of AI systems so they are deployed in a “sustainable,  
720 resource-friendly way which respects our planetary boundaries”.

721 As a first step towards addressing environmental dimensions of sustainability, we need  
722 transparency about the level of resources needed to develop and operate AI systems.  
723 To address this, we recommend: The introduction of horizontal, public-facing  
724 transparency requirements on the resource consumption and greenhouse gas emission  
725 impacts of AI systems – irrespective of risk level – in relation to design, data  
726 management and training, application, and underlying infrastructures (hardware, data  
727 centres, etc.).

## 728 **Council of Europe**

729 The Council of Europe established in 1949 is composed of 46 member states and six observer  
730 states (Canada, Holy See, Israel, Japan, Mexico, United States of America). The Council and  
731 the European Union (established 1957 & now comprised of 27 states) share the same  
732 fundamental values – human rights, democracy and the rule of law – but are separate entities  
733 which perform different, yet complementary, roles<sup>82</sup>. The Council of Europe brings together  
734 governments from across Europe – and beyond – to agree to form minimum legal standards in  
735 a wide range of areas. It then monitors how well countries apply the standards that they have  
736 chosen to sign up to.

## 737 **Framework Convention On Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy And** 738 **The Rule Of Law the first binding international treaty on AI**

739 Council of Europe’s ad hoc Committee on Artificial Intelligence (CAHAI) was tasked in 2019 with  
740 examining the feasibility of negotiating a legally binding treaty to ensure that activities within the  
741 lifecycle of artificial intelligence systems are “fully consistent with human rights, democracy and  
742 the rule of law, while being conducive to technological progress and innovation”.

743 CAHAI’s final paper on the “Possible elements of a legal framework on artificial  
744 intelligence, based on Council of Europe’s standards on human rights, democracy and  
745 the rule of law<sup>83</sup>” was adopted in December 2021, [and] the Committee of Ministers of  
746 the Council of Europe instructed the succeeding Committee on Artificial Intelligence  
747 (CAI) to elaborate a Framework Convention on the activities within the lifecycle of  
748 artificial intelligence systems, “based on the Council of Europe’s standards on human  
749 rights, democracy and the rule of law, and conducive to innovation, which can be

750 composed of a binding legal instrument of a transversal character, including notably  
751 general common principles”.

752 The Framework Convention was drafted by the 46 member states of the Council of Europe, with  
753 the participation of all observer states: Canada, Japan, Mexico, the Holy See and the United  
754 States of America, as well as the European Union, and a significant number of non-member  
755 states: Australia, Argentina, Costa Rica, Israel, Peru and Uruguay.

756  
757 This framework is meant to inform the development, design and application of AI systems based  
758 on the Council’s standards. The framework has a focus on ensuring the continued seamless  
759 application of human rights especially in contexts where AI systems assist or replace human  
760 decision-making or perform other tasks relevant in such contexts and to assure that AI systems  
761 shall only be used in such a way that they do not, directly or indirectly, endanger or undermine  
762 democratic processes.

763  
764 Who is covered by the framework?

765  
766 ■The Framework Convention covers the use of AI systems by public authorities –  
767 including private actors acting on their behalf – and private actors.

768 ■The Convention offers Parties two modalities to comply with its principles and  
769 obligations when regulating the private sector: Parties may opt to be directly obliged by  
770 the relevant Convention provisions or, as an alternative, take other measures to comply  
771 with the treaty’s provisions while fully respecting their international obligations regarding  
772 human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

773 ■Parties to the Framework Convention are not required to apply the provisions of the  
774 treaty to activities related to the protection of their national security interests but must  
775 ensure that such activities respect international law and democratic institutions and  
776 processes. The Framework Convention does not apply to national defense matters nor  
777 to research and development activities, except when the testing of AI systems may have  
778 the potential to interfere with human rights, democracy, or the rule of law.

779  
780 Chapter II Article 4 39 is a list of the main global and regional international human rights  
781 instruments and treaties to which various states that negotiated the Framework Convention may  
782 be Parties to.

783  
784  
785  
786 The Framework was adopted on 17 May 2024 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of  
787 Europe at its 133th Session held in Strasbourg, and will be opened for signature on the  
788 occasion of the Conference of Ministers of Justice in Vilnius (Lithuania) on 5 September 2024.

789 **European Ethical Charter on the use of Artificial Intelligence in Judicial systems**<sup>84</sup>

790 In December 2018, The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) adopted  
791 the Working Group on quality of justice’s (GT-QUAL)<sup>85</sup> “European ethical Charter on the use of  
792 Artificial Intelligence in judicial systems and their environment” as one of the first European  
793 texts setting out ethical principles relating to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in judicial  
794 systems and the main principles to be observed when developing AI applications in alignment  
795 with Human Rights.

797 The CEPJ Charter takes the strong position that “it is essential to ensure that AI remains a tool  
798 in the service of the general interest and that its use respects individual rights.” The Charter  
799 identifies five core principles to be respected in the field of AI and justice and asserts that  
800 “compliance with these principles must be ensured in the processing of judicial decisions and  
801 data by algorithms and in the use made of them.” The Charter principles are:

- 802 1. Principle of respect of fundamental rights: ensuring that the design and implementation of  
803 artificial intelligence tools and services are compatible with fundamental rights;
- 804 2. Principle of non-discrimination: specifically preventing the development or intensification of any  
805 discrimination between individuals or groups of individuals;
- 806 3. Principle of quality and security: with regard to the processing of judicial decisions and data,  
807 using certified sources and intangible data with models conceived in a multi-disciplinary manner,  
808 in a secure technological environment;
- 809 4. Principle of transparency, impartiality and fairness: making data processing methods accessible  
810 and understandable, authorising external audits;
- 811 5. Principle “under user control”: precluding a prescriptive approach and ensuring that users are  
812 informed actors and in control of their choices.

813




Figure 5 “The work of CEPEJ on AI.” CEPEJ (2021)

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815  
816  
817

818 The CEPEJ Artificial Intelligence Advisory Body (AIAB)<sup>86</sup> (see above) monitors the actual  
819 emergence of artificial intelligence applications in the justice sector and provides expert  
820 guidance on the operationalisation of the principles of the Charter. The AIAB is in the process

821 of developing an AI compliance “Assessment Tool” checklist and guidelines which will give  
822 authorities in charge of implementing judicial AI systems more practical guidance on how to  
823 apply the CEPEJ Charter’s five principles.

824  
825 The CEPEJ has also established an Resource Centre on Cyberjustice and Artificial Intelligence  
826 (ReC)<sup>87</sup>. The ReC maintains a publicly accessible registry of AI systems and other key  
827 cyberjustice tools used in judiciary cyberinfrastructure. “The Centre serves as a starting point for  
828 detailed examinations of specific applications with a view to their compliance with European  
829 standards of democracy, human rights and rule of law. Relevant authorities, researchers and  
830 the interested public are invited to use the displayed information for that purpose”<sup>88</sup>.

831

### 832 UK Algorithmic Transparency Standard

833 The Cabinet Office’s Central Digital and Data Office has developed an algorithmic transparency  
834 standard for government departments and public sector bodies with the Centre for Data Ethics  
835 and Innovation making the UK one of the first countries in the world to develop a national  
836 algorithmic transparency standard<sup>89</sup>. The standard has been piloted by some public sector  
837 organisations and will be further developed based on feedback.

838 The UK is also adopting a pro-innovation approach to AI regulation through a framework that aims  
839 to build public confidence and to provide “a clear and unified approach to regulation” without  
840 introduction of new legislation<sup>90</sup>:

841 Initially, we do not intend to introduce new legislation. By rushing to legislate too early, we would  
842 risk placing undue burdens on businesses. But alongside empowering regulators to take a lead,  
843 we are also setting expectations. Our new monitoring functions will provide a real time  
844 assessment of how the regulatory framework is performing so that we can be confident that it is  
845 proportionate.

846 The UK framework is underpinned by 5 principles to guide and inform the responsible  
847 development and use of AI in all sectors of the economy. These five principles will be issued on  
848 a non-statutory basis and implemented by existing regulators.

- 849 ● Safety, security and robustness
- 850 ● Appropriate transparency and explainability
- 851 ● Fairness
- 852 ● Accountability and governance
- 853 ● Contestability and redress

854 The proposed framework is aligned with, and supplemented by, a variety of tools for trustworthy  
855 AI, such as assurance techniques, voluntary guidance and technical standards. The UK  
856 Government will promote the use of such tools and is collaborating with partners like the [UK AI](#)

857 [Standards Hub](#)<sup>91</sup> to encourage responsible AI innovation (see [part 4](#) of the Framework for  
858 details). The Framework also acknowledges risk and promises regulatory intervention to ensure  
859 that AI does not cause harm at a societal level, threatening democracy<sup>92</sup> or UK values:

860 We have made an initial assessment of AI-specific risks and their potential to cause harm, with  
861 reference in our analysis to the values that they threaten if left unaddressed. These values  
862 include safety, security, fairness, privacy and agency, human rights, societal well-being and  
863 prosperity.

864 Our assessment of cross-cutting AI risk identified a range of high-level risks that our framework  
865 will seek to prioritise and mitigate with proportionate interventions. For example, safety risks  
866 include physical damage to humans and property, as well as damage to mental health.<sup>[footnote 42]</sup> AI  
867 creates a range of new security risks to individuals, organisations, and critical infrastructure.<sup>[footnote  
868 43]</sup> Without government action, AI could cause and amplify discrimination that results in, for  
869 example, unfairness in the justice system.<sup>[footnote 44]</sup> Similarly, without regulatory oversight, AI  
870 technologies could pose risks to our privacy and human dignity, potentially harming our  
871 fundamental liberties.<sup>[footnote 45]</sup>

## 872 **United States**

### 873 **Post GDPR Data sharing history between EU the United States**

874 Despite the profound difference between Europe and the United States, data can be transferred  
875 between these two giant economies of the Western world.

876 The United States has a special status. The Federal Trade Commission in the United States  
877 and the European Commission formulated the Privacy Shield – an arrangement that allows  
878 researchers to voluntarily comply with the European regulation.

879 By virtue of this arrangement many companies, among them Microsoft, Google, Amazon and  
880 Facebook, have joined Privacy Shield to permit data transfer to them. Research data can be  
881 stored in Privacy Shield cloud services. Otherwise, researchers should refrain from transferring  
882 GDPR data to a server in the United States.

### 883 **US/EU TTC Joint Roadmap for trustworthy AI and risk management**

884 The U.S.-EU Joint Statement of the Trade and Technology Council released a “Joint Roadmap”  
885 on evaluation and measurement tools for trustworthy AI and risk management December 1,  
886 2022<sup>93</sup>. This Joint Roadmap aims to guide the development of tools, methodologies, and  
887 approaches to AI risk management and trustworthy AI by the EU and the United States and to  
888 advance our shared interest in supporting international standardization efforts and promoting  
889 trustworthy AI on the basis of a shared dedication to democratic values and human rights. The  
890 roadmap takes practical steps to advance trustworthy AI and uphold our shared commitment to  
891 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) *Recommendation on AI*  
892 (see OECD section above).

893 In *The EU and U.S. diverge on AI regulation: A transatlantic comparison and steps to*  
894 *alignment*<sup>94</sup> Brookings considers the broad approaches of the U.S. and the EU to AI risk  
895 management, compares policy developments across eight key subfields, and discusses  
896 collaborative steps taken so far, especially through the above-mentioned EU-U.S. Trade and  
897 Technology Council. Of particular interest to the bill of rights team was the below application  
898 based comparison table (Engler, 2023):

899  
900 **Comparison of EU and U.S. AI risk management by application type**  
901

| Application   | Examples  | EU policy developments   | U.S. policy developments  |
|---|---|--|---|
| <b>AI for human processes/socioeconomic decisions</b> | AI in hiring, educational access, and financial services approval | GDPR requires human in the loop for significant decisions. High-risk AI applications in Annex III of EU AI Act would need to meet quality standards, implement risk management system, and perform conformity assessment | AI Bill of Rights and associated Federal Agency Actions have created patchwork oversight for some of these applications.          |
| <b>AI in consumer products</b>                        | AI in medical devices, partially autonomous vehicles, and planes  | EU AI Act considers AI implemented within products that are already regulated under EU law to be high risk and further would have new AI standards incorporated into current regulatory process.                         | Individual federal agency adaptations, such as by FDA for medical devices; DOT for automated vehicles; CPSC for consumer products |

| Application  | Examples   | EU policy developments  | U.S. policy developments |
|--|--|---|--------------------------|
| <b>Chatbots</b>  | Sales or customer service chatbots on commercial websites                            | EU AI Act would require disclosure that a chatbot is an AI (i.e., not a human).   | NA                       |
| <b>Social media recommender &amp; moderation systems</b> | Newsfeeds and group recommendation s on TikTok, Twitter, Facebook, or Instagram      | EU Digital Services Act creates transparency requirement for these AI systems; also enables independent research and analysis   | NA                       |
| <b>Algorithms on e-commerce platforms</b>                | Algorithms for search or recommendation of products and vendors on Amazon or Shopify | EU Digital Markets Act will restrict self-preferencing algorithms in digital markets. Individual anti-trust actions (e.g., against Amazon, and Google Shopping) to reduce self-preferencing in E-commerce algorithms and platform design. | NA                       |

| <b>Application</b>                      | <b>Examples</b>                                    | <b>EU policy developments</b>   | <b>U.S. policy developments</b>   |
|---|--|---|---|
| <b>Foundations models/generative AI</b> | Stability AI's Stable Diffusion and OpenAI's GPT-3 | Draft proposals of the EU AI Act consider quality and risk management requirements.   | NA  |
| <b>Facial recognition</b>               | Clearview AI, PimEyes, Amazon Rekognition          | EU AI Act will include restrictions on remote facial recognition and biometric identification. EU Data Protection Authorities have fined facial recognition companies under GDPR. | NIST's AI Face Recognition Vendor Test program contributes efficacy and fairness information to the market for facial recognition software. |

Recommendation 20

| Application                 | Examples  | EU policy developments  | U.S. policy developments  |
|-----------------------------|---|---|---|
| <b>Targeted advertising</b> | Algorithmically targeted advertising on websites and phone applications | GDPR has fined Meta for using personal user data for behavioral ads. The Digital Services Act bans targeted advertising to children and certain types of profiling (e.g., by sexual orientation). It requires targeted ads have explanations and users have control over what ads they see. | Individual federal agency lawsuits have slightly curtailed some targeted advertising. This includes the DOJ and HUD, who successfully sued Meta for discriminatory housing ads and an FTC penalty against Twitter for using security data for targeted ads. |

902 Table 2

Engler, 2020

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904  
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912

Engler observes that:<sup>95</sup>

“The EU and U.S. strategies share a conceptual alignment on a risk-based approach, agree on key principles of trustworthy AI, and endorse an important role for international standards. However, the specifics of these AI risk management regimes have more differences than similarities. Regarding many specific AI applications, especially those related to socioeconomic processes and online platforms, the EU and U.S. are on a path to significant misalignment.

913 **NIST AI Risk Management Framework**

914 On March 30, 2023 The National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST), U.S.  
915 Department of Commerce, launched the [Trustworthy and Responsible AI Resource](#)  
916 [Center](#)(AIRC),<sup>96</sup> which will facilitate implementation of, and international alignment with, the  
917 NIST [Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework](#)(AI RMF, 2023).  
918 As directed by the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-283), NIST  
919 developed the *AI RMF* “to offer a voluntary resource to the organizations designing, developing,

920 deploying, or using AI systems to help manage the many risks [ to individuals, organizations,  
921 and society] of AI and promote trustworthy and responsible development and use of AI  
922 systems”<sup>97,98</sup>

923

924 The Framework is intended to be voluntary, rights-preserving, non-sector specific, and  
925 use-case agnostic, providing flexibility to organizations of all sizes and in all sectors and  
926 throughout society to implement the approaches in the Framework. The AI RMF is  
927 designed to equip organizations and individuals – AI actors – with approaches that  
928 increase the trustworthiness of AI systems.

929

930 In the NIST AI RMF<sup>99</sup>, risk refers to:

931

932 The composite measure of an event’s probability of occurring and the magnitude or  
933 degree of the consequences of the corresponding event. The impacts, or consequences,  
934 of AI systems can be positive, negative, or both and can result in opportunities or threats  
935 (Adapted from: ISO 31000:2018). When considering the negative impact of a potential  
936 event, risk is a function of 1) the negative impact, or magnitude of harm, that would arise  
937 if the circumstance or event occurs and 2) the likelihood of occurrence (Adapted from:  
938 OMB Circular A-130:2016).

939

940 Negative impact or harm can be experienced by individuals, groups, communities,  
941 organizations, society, the environment, and the planet.

942

943 The AI RMF<sup>100</sup> provides examples of potential harms (and harmed parties) that can be  
944 related to AI systems.

945



Figure 6

AI RMF NIST


946  
947

948 Appendix A in the AI RMF<sup>101</sup> offers detailed descriptions of AI Actor tasks including those  
949 associated with AI Design, Development, and Deployment separate from “Operation and  
950 Monitoring”, and “Test, Evaluation, Verification and Validation” (TEVV) , as well as end users,  
951 affected individuals/communities, third party entities, and the general public.

952

953 Ten priorities to advance the AI RMF and its use are detailed in the below *Roadmap for the*  
954 *NIST AI RMF*<sup>102</sup> starting with standards alignment (e.g., ISO/IEC 5338, ISO/IEC 38507, ISO/IEC  
955 22989, ISO/IEC 24028, ISO/IEC DIS 42001, and ISO/IEC NP 42005) and illustrating how the  
956 [Trustworthy and Responsible AI Resource Center](#)(AIRC) is positioned to offer support:

Recommendation



957  
958

## 959 **Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights**<sup>103</sup>

960 In October 2022 the *Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights: Making Automated Systems Work for the*  
961 *American People* was published by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.  
962 This framework was released one year after OSTP announced the launch of a process to  
963 develop “a bill of rights for an AI-powered world” and much public engagement. The Blueprint is  
964 a set of far-reaching goals aimed at averting harms caused by the rise of artificial intelligence  
965 systems, including guidelines for how to protect people's personal data and limit surveillance<sup>104</sup>.

966  
967 The AI Bill of Rights declares five principles that should guide the design, use, and deployment  
968 of automated systems to protect the American public in the age of artificial intelligence. This  
969 offers a promising vision of community-oriented equity unique amongst peer countries<sup>105</sup>.

970  
971 “This is the Biden-Harris administration really saying that we need to work together, not only just  
972 across government, but across all sectors, to really put equity at the center and civil rights at the  
973 center of the ways that we make and use and govern technologies,” said Alondra Nelson, deputy  
974 director for science and society at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy<sup>106</sup>.

975  
976 The framework is accompanied by a technical companion—a handbook for those seeking to  
977 incorporate these protections into policy and practice, including detailed steps toward  
978 actualizing these principles in the technological design process.

979  
980 The Blueprint on its own is non-binding, and without concrete legislation, some anticipate the  
981 private sector may ignore it<sup>107</sup> while others “voice concerns that the non-binding guidelines  
982 could lead to stifling regulation concerning artificial intelligence”<sup>108</sup>. Nandita Sampath, a policy

983 analyst focused on algorithmic accountability and bias at Consumer Reports commended the  
984 report as a step in the right direction saying<sup>109</sup>:

985

986 American consumers need protections from these complex systems that are used to evaluate  
987 them without their knowledge and without a meaningful explanation as to why they arrived at  
988 certain decisions. Consumers deserve to know why an automated decision system denies them  
989 an opportunity, particularly in sensitive cases. We hope to see more federal and state agencies  
990 implementing these recommendations and also ask Congress to codify these recommendations  
991 into law.

992

993 What happens next? As the US codifies policy and law from the blueprint, with the recent  
994 passage of the EU AI Act(EU AIA), United States companies will be subject to the EU AIA when  
995 they export to the EU. There are likely to be a multiplicity of cases similar to the OpenAI and  
996 ChatGPT situation in Italy. Lilian Edwards writes that “An even more profound issue is that the  
997 EU standards may by reciprocity or osmosis become global standards (e.g, via ISO). So just as  
998 the [EU AI] Act may become a global regulatory model, these standards may also become  
999 global rules in effect<sup>110</sup>.” In the meantime, there are several more U.S. Acts and Policies, some  
1000 binding and codifying, others proposed, and still others unbinding yet influencing policy and  
1001 practice of AI in the US. The AI Index Report 2024<sup>111</sup> summarizes that:

1002

1003 The number of AI-related regulations in the U.S. has risen significantly in the past year  
1004 and over the last five years. In 2023, there were 25 AI-related regulations, up from just  
1005 one in 2016. Last year alone, the total number of AI-related regulations grew by 56.3%.

1006

1007 Some highlights are featured in the list below.

1008

1009 Other AI related US Acts and Policies

- 1010
- AI in Government Act 2020 (DIVISION U, TITLE I)<sup>112</sup>

1011 codifies into law the GSA Artificial Intelligence (AI) Center of Excellence (CoE)<sup>113</sup>, which  
1012 was launched in 2019. It further calls on the Office of Management and Budget to provide  
1013 guidance for agency use of AI, and for the Office of Personnel Management to update the  
1014 occupational series for AI for Federal employees.

- 1015
- National AI Initiative Act (NAII 2021) <sup>114</sup>

1016 The mission of the National AI Initiative is to ensure continued U.S. leadership in AI research and  
1017 development, lead the world in the development and use of trustworthy AI in the public and  
1018 private sectors, and prepare the present and future U.S. workforce for the integration of AI  
1019 systems across all sectors of the economy and society and became law on January 1, 2021 as  
1020 part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2021, HR 6395, Division E.

- 1021
- [Four Principles of Explainable AI](#)(NIST 2021) <sup>115</sup>
- 1022 In this paper NIST introduces four principles that comprise fundamental properties for
- 1023 explainable AI systems. NIST recognizes that not all AI systems may require
- 1024 explanations. However, for those AI systems that are intended or required to be
- 1025 explainable, they propose that those systems adhere to the following four principles:
- Explanation: A system delivers or contains accompanying evidence or reason(s)
  - Meaningful: A system provides explanations that are understandable to the
  - Explanation Accuracy: An explanation correctly reflects the reason for generating
  - Knowledge Limits: A system only operates under conditions for which it was
- 1026 for outputs and/or processes.
- 1027 intended consumer(s).
- 1028
- 1029
- 1030
- 1031
- 1032
- 1033
- [National AI Research Resource \(NAIRR\)](#) (2023) An Implementation Plan for a National
- 1034 Artificial Intelligence Research Resource Jan 24, 2023
- 1035
- Government-wide policy Advancing Governance, Innovation, and Risk Management for Agency
  - Food and Drug Administration (FDA): [Clinical Decisions Support Software](#) (2022)
  - [H.R.6580 - Algorithmic Accountability Act / S.3572](#) (2022) - Proposed
  - [US American Data Privacy and Protection Act](#) - Proposed
- 1036 Use of Artificial Intelligence<sup>116</sup> (OMB March 28, 2024)
- 1037
- 1038
- 1039
- 1040
- [Assessing Adverse Impact in Software, Algorithms, and Artificial Intelligence Used in](#)
- 1041 [Employment Selection Procedures Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964](#)<sup>117</sup> (05-18-2023)
- 1042 A Technical assistance document, not new policy, which applies principles already established in
- 1043 the Title VII statutory provisions. The contents of this publication do not have the force and effect
- 1044 of law and are meant only to provide clarity to the public regarding existing requirements under
- 1045 the law. Here the EEOC provides guidance on the use of AI in employment selection procedures
- 1046 emphasizing that:
- 1047
- 1048 **To ensure fair and unbiased AI usage in the workplace, employers should consider the**
- 1049 **following recommendations:**
1. Conduct a job analysis by identifying the essential functions, duties, skills, qualifications,
  2. Validate the AI system by testing and evaluating the AI system to ensure its accuracy,
  3. Involve human decision-makers who can review and override the AI system's results if
- 1050 and competencies required for each position. Ensure that the AI system aligns with the
- 1051 identified criteria to avoid any implicit bias that already may be present in an industry.
- 1052
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1061

1062 **State level legislation on AI in the U.S.**

1063 In the 2023 legislative session, at least 25 states, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia  
1064 introduced artificial intelligence bills, and 14 states and Puerto Rico adopted resolutions or  
1065 enacted legislation<sup>118</sup>. In recent years, Alabama, Colorado, Illinois, and Vermont have passed  
1066 bills creating a commission, task force, or oversight position to evaluate the use of AI in their  
1067 states and make recommendations regarding its use.

1068

1069 **California**

1070 [ACR-215 23 Asilomar AI Principles](#)

1071 Adopted in California (2018), the Asilomar Ai Principles offer guiding values for the development  
1072 of artificial intelligence and of related public policy.

1073

1074 **U.S. Municipalities govern AI in hiring and use by Law Enforcement Agencies**

1075 New York City

1076 Effective July 5, 2023 the New York City Local Law 144<sup>119</sup> **regulates AI and automated**  
1077 **decision-making tools for employee hiring and promotions**. The bill was signed into law on  
1078 December 11, 2021 and originally, was supposed to go into effect on January 1, 2023, but the  
1079 high volume of public comments on the proposed implementing rules delayed the effective date  
1080 of the law. The law prohibits employers and employment agencies from using an automated  
1081 employment decision tool unless the tool has been subject to a bias audit within one year of the  
1082 use of the tool, information about the bias audit is publicly available, and certain notices have  
1083 been provided to employees or job candidates.

1084 Baltimore, Maryland

1085 [Act 21-038](#) – Surveillance Technology in Baltimore

1086 Prohibits Baltimore city government from obtaining or contracting with another entity that provides  
1087 certain face surveillance technology, prohibits any person in Baltimore City from obtaining or  
1088 using face surveillance technology, and requires the Director of Baltimore City Information and  
1089 Technology to submit an annual report to the Mayor and City Council regarding the use of  
1090 surveillance by the Mayor and City Council. Introduced: 1/11/21; Approved: 6/14/21; Signed:  
1091 8/16/21.

1092 Bellingham, Washington

1093 [Ballot Initiative #2](#) – Ban on Advanced Policing Technologies

1094 Prohibits government use of facial recognition and predictive policing technologies. Bellingham  
1095 residents voted to prohibit the city from acquiring or using facial recognition technology or

1096 contracting with a third party to use facial recognition technology on the city's behalf. The  
1097 measure also restricts use of illegally obtained data in policing or trials. Passed 11/10/21

## 1098 Canada

- 1099 • [Canada's Artificial Intelligence and Data Act \(AIDA\)](#) - Proposed
- 1100 • [Canada's Directive on Automated Decision-Making](#) - In Effect

## 1101 Latin America and the Caribbean

1102 The CAF-Development Bank of Latin America and UNESCO signed a letter of intent in 2022 to  
1103 work together on the implementation of the Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial  
1104 Intelligence (AI) in Latin America and the Caribbean<sup>120</sup>.

1105  
1106 At the country level, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay have released national AI  
1107 strategies<sup>121</sup>. The first countries to publish their strategies were Argentina, Colombia and  
1108 Uruguay, followed by Brazil and Chile in 2021. Brazil, Chile and Uruguay have all incorporated  
1109 responsible AI principles into their broader AI policies and are due to publish their own AI ethics  
1110 policies.

### 1111 Colombia

1112 Colombia was first in Latin America to publish a standalone AI ethics framework.<sup>122</sup> This  
1113 document "seeks to provide a soft law guide of recommendations and suggestions to Public  
1114 Entities, to address the formulation and management of projects that include the use of Artificial  
1115 Intelligence (AI)" and "brings together international practices that are not mandatory for any of  
1116 the entities but that are presented as recommendations". Colombia has also been investing in  
1117 new AI policy initiatives, including an AI strategy, and has formed an international AI council.

### 1118 Argentina

1119 In Argentina, changes in political leadership have resulted in the new administration putting the  
1120 previously released national AI strategy on hold but it has gone ahead with Resolution 90/2021,  
1121 which mentions the need to address AI adoption in the public sector and skills development. The  
1122 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) now describes the country's AI strategy as "to be  
1123 continued."

### 1124 *Buenos Aires City Plan*

1125 In Buenos Aires, Argentina there is now a city plan<sup>123</sup> for AI that "seeks to generate a positive  
1126 impact in all areas of citizens' lives through the development and use of artificial intelligence."

## 1127 Mexico

1128 Mexico began work on an AI strategy in 2017<sup>124</sup>. First, the UK Embassy in Mexico, with support  
1129 from the Office of the Mexican President, commissioned Oxford Insights to draft a national AI  
1130 plan which was published as a white paper in June 2018 entitled: “Towards An Ai Strategy In  
1131 Mexico: Harnessing the AI Revolution.”<sup>125</sup> Then, an IA2030Mx citizen coalition was created,  
1132 founded by nine institutions from all sectors. The IA2030Mx effort addressed the need to have a  
1133 national, multidisciplinary, multisectoral and collaborative exercise to develop an AI action plan  
1134 which could serve government, academia, civil society and industry. This output was presented  
1135 as the Mexican National Artificial Intelligence Agenda<sup>126</sup> in 2020.

## 1136 Australia

1137 In Australia there are several efforts of relevance on AI governance and cross-domain  
1138 information sharing. Here we describe a few:

1139 The Australian computer society (ACS) convenes working groups on data sharing and AI ethics.  
1140 A data taskforce was created to address the overarching challenge of developing ethical and  
1141 privacy-preserving frameworks that support automated data sharing to facilitate the creation and  
1142 deployment of smart services. This framework will seek to address technical, regulatory, and  
1143 authorising frameworks. The intention is to identify, adopt, adapt, or develop frameworks for  
1144 data governance, privacy protection, and practical data sharing that facilitates smart service  
1145 creation and cross-jurisdictional data sharing between governments. Three publications arising  
1146 from this work will be of interest to this audience: 1) **Data Sharing Frameworks** (ACS, 2017)<sup>127</sup>  
1147 2) **Privacy in Data Sharing: A Guide for Government and Business** (ACS, 2018)<sup>128</sup>. This  
1148 paper describes a framework for privacy-preserving data sharing which builds on the 2017 paper,  
1149 expanding the concept of a Personal Information Factor (PIF) and introducing a Data Safety Factor  
1150 with recommendations for threshold settings. This paper further develops the concept of a  
1151 quantified ‘Five Safes’ data analytics framework and briefly examines the implications of such  
1152 frameworks when artificially intelligent algorithms are used to analyse data. And 3) **Privacy-**  
1153 **preserving data sharing frameworks: People Projects, Data and Output**<sup>129</sup>. This paper  
1154 tackles the challenge of balancing data sharing benefits with citizens’ privacy rights.

1155 Another ACS collaboration takes as its charge “**Making the Invisible Visible**”, and this group is  
1156 discussing ways of training data stewards to ‘make the invisible visible’ by remaining alert to  
1157 who (and what) is missing, under-represented or mis-represented in data in any given context.  
1158 They aspire to enrich the application of FAIR principles in the “making” of data.

1159 Particular to AI, In 2019 Australia adopted an Artificial Intelligence Ethics Framework<sup>130</sup>, a set of  
1160 voluntary ethics principles to ensure AI applications are safe, secure and reliable. The  
1161 Australian AI Ethics principles are:

- 1162 ● *Human, societal and environmental wellbeing*: AI systems should benefit individuals, society and  
1163 the environment.

- 1164 ● *Human-centred values*: AI systems should respect human rights, diversity, and the autonomy of  
1165 individuals.
- 1166 ● *Fairness*: AI systems should be inclusive and accessible, and should not involve or result in unfair  
1167 discrimination against individuals, communities or groups.
- 1168 ● *Privacy protection and security*: AI systems should respect and uphold privacy rights and data  
1169 protection, and ensure the security of data.
- 1170 ● *Reliability and safety*: AI systems should reliably operate in accordance with their intended  
1171 purpose.
- 1172 ● *Transparency and explainability*: There should be transparency and responsible disclosure so  
1173 people can understand when they are being significantly impacted by AI, and can find out when  
1174 an AI system is engaging with them.
- 1175 ● *Contestability*: When an AI system significantly impacts a person, community, group or  
1176 environment, there should be a timely process to allow people to challenge the use or outcomes  
1177 of the AI system.
- 1178 ● *Accountability*: People responsible for the different phases of the AI system lifecycle should be  
1179 identifiable and accountable for the outcomes of the AI systems, and human oversight of AI  
1180 systems should be enabled.

1181 In 2023, just four years later, the Australian Government opened a period of open feedback on  
1182 responsible AI, informing its public that as “Many other countries are already looking at new  
1183 governance arrangements to ensure AI is used responsibly” they are seeking input on “what  
1184 else the Australian Government can do to support the safe and responsible use of AI.” Which  
1185 could be through either or both: “voluntary approaches, like tools, frameworks and principles” or  
1186 “enforceable regulatory approaches, like laws and mandatory standards”. The period of input  
1187 closed at the end of July 2023.

1188

## 1189 New Zealand

1190

1191 There are no AI specific laws in New Zealand(NZ), but there is a rich ecosystem of AI policy  
1192 research and collaboration. The AI Forum founded in 2017 as a non-governmental organization  
1193 brings together New Zealand’s AI community, including innovators, end users, investors,  
1194 regulators, researchers, educators, entrepreneurs and interested public. They make a “curated  
1195 collection of AI governance resources available to equip members with knowledge and  
1196 the guidance to address the most critical issues in AI systems, with the ultimate goal of  
1197 maximising value and fostering trust and confidence in AI technologies while  
1198 minimising risks and negative societal impacts<sup>131</sup>”.

1199

1200 Meanwhile, most government agencies have signed up to NZ’s 2020 [Algorithm](#)  
1201 [Charter](#)<sup>132</sup>. Signatories to the Algorithm Charter have agreed to apply certain principles

1202 in how they use algorithms, especially in designing access to public services but it  
1203 doesn't address newer technologies such as the LLMs<sup>133</sup>.

1204

1205 The Algorithm Charter is part of a wider ecosystem works together with existing tools,  
1206 networks and research, including<sup>134</sup>:

- 1207 ● Principles for the Safe and Effective Use of Data and Analytics (Privacy  
1208 Commissioner and Government Chief Data Steward, 2018)
- 1209 ● Government Use of Artificial Intelligence in New Zealand (New Zealand Law  
1210 Foundation and Otago University, 2019)
- 1211 ● Trustworthy AI in Aotearoa – AI Principles (AI Forum New Zealand, 2020)
- 1212 ● Open Government Partnership, an international agreement to increase  
1213 transparency.
- 1214 ● Data Protection and Use Policy (Social Wellbeing Agency, 2020)
- 1215 ● Privacy, Human Rights and Ethics Framework (Ministry of Social Development).

1216

1217 In July 2023, New Zealand's Government Chief Digital Officer (GCDO) released early, interim,  
1218 very practical Initial Guidance on Generative AI in the public service.<sup>135</sup> This advice from joint  
1219 system leads and its attached A3 are "intended to support agencies to make more informed  
1220 decisions about using GenAI, balancing benefits and risks<sup>136</sup>".

1221

1222 Page two of the handout (aka A3) offers a concise crosswalk of NZ policy concerns  
1223 compared to US, EU and other nations<sup>137</sup>.

1224

| Comparison of global approaches to AI risk management   |   |  |  |  |
|---|---|--|--|--|
|   | EU  | US   | Other  | NZ   |
| <b>Dedicated AI legislation?</b>  | AI Act in the works and expected to become law later in the year; legislation will require creation of standards<br><br>Existing GDPR covers algorithmic decision making and targeted ads, and Digital Services and Digital Market Acts target transparency and fair market competition                 | White House has produced AI Bill of Rights and other guidelines; these have no mechanism to compel compliance<br><br>Algorithm Accountability Act before both chambers of Congress; not clear whether has political legs to progress<br><br>Some state legislatures have passed algorithm accountability legislation; NYC has imposed requirements on the use of algorithms in hiring/promotion<br><br>Some existing legislation has implications for AI e.g. around fair trading practices, anti-discrimination | China: Has taken a "vertical" approach; individual pieces of legislation on algorithmic recommendations, deep synthesis, and generative AI. Legislation around generative AI and deepfakes has created a compulsory registry; it is expected this will be a part of future legislation for different AI<br><br>Canada: Digital Charter Implementation Act (Bill C-27) passed second reading in lower house; long process to go before adopted<br><br>Australia: Consultation process for creating legislation launched June 2023, including rapid evidence review and a report to inform public submissions<br><br>UK: no dedicated legislation, AI white paper describes possible future regulation in context of wider strategic approach to AI. | No dedicated legislation.<br><br>Some existing legislation has implications for AI e.g. Privacy Act, Human Rights Act, as well as Te Tiriti o Waitangi.<br><br>Algorithm Charter has been adopted by most government agencies. |
| <b>AI for human processes/socioeconomic decisions</b><br><i>AI in hiring, educational access, and financial services approval</i> | GDPR requires human in the loop for significant decisions.<br><br>"High-risk" AI applications AI Act would need to meet quality standards, implement risk management system, and perform conformity assessment  | AI Bill of Rights and associated Federal Agency Actions have created patchwork oversight for some of these applications. Notable gap even in Algorithm Accountability Act is that some sectors are out of scope, including public services<br><br>NYC requires impact assessment of hiring and promotion decisions that involve algorithms; in practice, these requirements are poorly defined, and deadlines have been repeatedly pushed back as a result.  | Canada: Directive on Automated Decision Making applies to government services and imposes requirements around transparency when there are AI components in decision making<br><br>UK: Piloting Algorithmic Transparency Reporting Standard in some parts of government   | Algorithm Charter has been adopted by most government agencies   |
| <b>AI in consumer products</b><br><i>AI in medical devices, partially autonomous vehicles, and planes</i>                         | AI Act considers AI implemented within products that are already regulated under EU law to be high risk; new AI standards to be incorporated into current regulatory process.   | Individual federal agency adaptations, such as by FDA for medical devices; DOT for automated vehicles; CPSC for consumer products  |  | Existing laws such as Consumer Guarantees Act, Human Rights Act, Privacy Act apply as relevant   |
| <b>Chatbots</b>   | AI Act would require disclosure that a chatbot is an AI (i.e., not a human).  | California BOT Act makes it an offense to pretend to be a person to sell products of influence elections.  |  | Existing laws such as Fair Trading Act 1986, Human Rights Act, Privacy Act 2020 apply as relevant, as does sector-specific regulation (e.g. in the financial services sector)  |
| <b>Social media recommender algorithms</b><br><i>Newsfeeds and group recommendations on social media</i>                          | Digital Services Act creates transparency requirement; also enables independent research and analysis   |  | China: Consumer must be informed that an algorithm has been used   | NZ Code of Practice for Online Safety and Harms applies as relevant if a company has adopted it  |
| <b>Algorithms on e-commerce platforms</b><br><i>Algorithms for search or recommendation of products and vendors</i>               | Digital Markets Act restricts self-preferencing algorithms in digital markets   |  | China: Prohibits use of personal info in price setting   |  |
| <b>Foundation models/generative AI</b><br><i>DALL-E, ChatGPT</i>  | Draft proposals of the EU AI Act consider quality and risk management requirements.   |  | China: Output must be true, unbiased, and conform with state ideology; developers responsible for all content produced (even by a different end user). Developers responsible for ensuring training data are unbiased, objective and accurate  | Privacy Act applies; Office of the Privacy Commissioner released guidance on this in May 2023.   |
| <b>Facial recognition</b>   | AI Act will include restrictions on remote facial recognition and biometric identification. Data Protection Authorities have fined facial recognition companies under GDPR.   | NIST's AI Face Recognition Vendor Test program contributes efficacy and fairness information to the market for facial recognition software.  |  | Office of the Privacy Commissioner is exploring a code of practice on biometrics.  |
| <b>Targeted advertising</b><br><i>Algorithmically targeted advertising on websites and phone applications</i>                     | Meta has been fined under GDPR for using personal user data for behavioural ads. The Digital Services Act bans targeted advertising to children and certain types of profiling (e.g., by sexual orientation). It requires targeted ads have explanations and users have control over what ads they see. | Individual federal agency lawsuits have slightly curtailed some targeted advertising. This includes the DOJ and HUD, who successfully sued Meta for discriminatory housing ads and an FTC penalty against Twitter for using security data for targeted ads.  |  | Existing law such as Unsolicited Electronic Messages Act 2007 and Privacy Act 2020 apply as relevant.  |

Adapted from Engler 2023 The EU and U.S. diverge on AI regulation: A transatlantic comparison and steps to alignment. Brookings Institution. Available at <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-eu-and-us-diverge-on-ai-regulation-a-transatlantic-comparison-and-steps-to-alignment/>

1225  
1226  
1227

Table 3

-GCDO, NZ

1228 **Jurisdictional Layering**

1229 As efforts like EOSC future, and membership organizations like the Research Data Alliance  
1230 navigate and claim rights, there is a need to have informed conversations about balancing &  
1231 navigating jurisdictionally layered rights. Literature tagging and matrix approaches are aids for  
1232 observing jurisdictionally layered use cases and scenarios to better understand how overlapping  
1233 rights, misalignments and gaps protect or leave vulnerable the interests of individuals and  
1234 communities in an increasingly AI influenced world. Indeed, the NZ example above adapted  
1235 from Engler on EU/US policy inspires making.

1236 **Jurisdictional Layering of AI in Academia**

1237 The University of Notre Dame and the University of California offer illustrative examples of how  
1238 Model Centric/Artificial Intelligence research work can face extra burdens through signatory  
1239 acts as well as through national, state, or local law covering an academic's affiliated  
1240 institution(s) in addition to funder policies and laws governing funders in funders' home


1241 states/countries of organization. For example, Researchers, Staff and Students University of  
1242 Notre Dame near South Bend, Indiana in the United States abide by the relevant US  
1243 jurisdictional and funding agency policies and international collaborators' policies which all  
1244 overlay one another, but in addition the University is also a signatory of the the Rome Call for  
1245 AI Ethics (2022).<sup>138, 139</sup> While researchers at University of California need to be informed by  
1246 the Asilomar AI Principles<sup>140,141</sup> because the State of California is a signatory. This  
1247 complicated jurisdictionally layered environment, coupled with cost of training and running  
1248 artificial intelligence models plays a role in how industry has overtaken academia in AI use.

1249  
1250 In The Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2024 it is reported that:<sup>142</sup>

1251  
1252 Until 2014, academia led in the release of machine learning models. Since then, industry  
1253 has taken the lead. In 2023, there were 51 notable machine learning models produced  
1254 by industry compared to just 15 from academia (The AI Index 2024 Annual Report,  
1255 Figure 1.3.1). Significantly, 21 notable models resulted from industry/academic  
1256 collaborations in 2023, a new high. Creating cutting-edge AI models now demands a  
1257 substantial amount of data, computing power, and financial resources that are not  
1258 available in academia. This shift toward increased industrial dominance in leading AI  
1259 models was first highlighted in last year's AI Index report. Although this year the gap has  
1260 slightly narrowed, the trend largely persists.

## Number of foundation models by sector

Source: Bommasani et al., 2023 | Chart: 2024 AI Index report



1262  
1263 Creating policy pathways and access to resources to pursue research in AI and Computational  
1264 modeling generally is going to be essential to assuring a scientifically sound, rigorous basis for  
1265 delivering AI research and instruction for professors and students alike..

## 1266 AI in Migration

1267 The use of AI for Migration surveillance demands we use the lens of jurisdictional  
1268 layering. Artificial intelligence can be used to enhance surveillance and forecasts of  
1269 people on the move in origin and transit countries. When AI driven surveillance in  
1270 Middle East and North African countries is traced back to EU funding through  
1271 instruments like the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and/or Neighbourhood,  
1272 Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – GE)  
1273 whose human rights and AI bill of rights are in play as people cross and attempt to  
1274 cross borders?<sup>143</sup> What about at the US Mexico border? Where is it okay to run such  
1275 models and use them to aid migration decision-making or border policy? Do state,  
1276 municipal, country or regional AI policies take precedence? The policies for use of AI in  
1277 law enforcement or intelligence agencies or both?

1278  
1279 The below table of use cases presented in the 2020 report on **Opportunities and**  
1280 **Challenges for the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Border Control** EU shows a  
1281 range of migration & security related uses of AI<sup>144</sup>:  
1282

Recommendation 2024-01-01

Table 19: Scaling complexity categorisation based upon feasibility

| Use case ID | Short name                                      | Feasibility score | Scaling complexity |
|-------------|---|-------------------|--------------------|
| VISA-1      | Application chatbot                             | 3,9               | LOW                |
| VISA-3      | Application triaging                            | 3,1               | HIGH               |
| VISA-8      | Identification of irregular travelling patterns | 3,0               | MEDIUM             |
| VISA-9      | Tailored application form                       | 2,8               | HIGH               |
| ETIAS-1     | Risk assessment                                 | 2,5               | HIGH               |
| ETIAS-4     | Application chatbot                             | 3,6               | MEDIUM             |
| LTSTAY-1    | Application chatbot                             | 3,7               | MEDIUM             |
| LTSTAY-3    | Application triaging                            | 3,5               | HIGH               |
| LTSTAY-9    | Moving within the Schengen area                 | 3,4               | HIGH               |
| ASYLUM-3    | Vulnerability assessment                        | 2,9               | HIGH               |
| ASYLUM-5    | Registration chatbot                            | 3,9               | MEDIUM             |
| ASYLUM-7    | Abscondment risk assessment                     | 3,0               | HIGH               |
| ASYLUM-11   | Refugee allocation                              | 3,2               | HIGH               |
| ASYLUM-14   | Intelligent search engine                       | 2,8               | MEDIUM             |
| SISSIRENE-1 | Alert detection                                 | 3,5               | HIGH               |
| SISSIRENE-4 | Knowledge search/management tools               | 3,8               | MEDIUM             |
| SISSIRENE-6 | Automatic form completion                       | 3,9               | MEDIUM             |
| SCHENGEN-3  | Triaging border crossings                       | 3,3               | HIGH               |
| SCHENGEN-4  | Border flow analytics                           | 2,9               | HIGH               |
| OPS-3       | Incident prediction                             | 3,6               | MEDIUM             |
| OPS-5       | Triaging chatbot for L1/L2                      | 4,0               | LOW                |
| OPS-7       | Learning chatbot                                | 3,9               | LOW                |
| POLICY-2    | Linking regulations                             | 4,7               | LOW                |
| POLICY-5    | Clustering of regulations                       | 4,4               | LOW                |
| POLICY-8    | Automated newsgathering                         | 3,0               | HIGH               |
| POLICY-9    | Effective stakeholder communication             | 4,3               | LOW                |
| POLICY-12   | Predicting policy acceptance                    | 3,2               | MEDIUM             |
| CROSS-1     | Multi-lingual translation                       | 4,0               | LOW                |
| CROSS-6     | Forged supporting document detection            | 2,7               | HIGH               |
| CROSS-7     | Historical case reasoning                       | 2,6               | HIGH               |
| CROSS-8     | Ethical monitoring                              | 3,6               | HIGH*              |
| CROSS-12    | Forged travel document detection                | 3,6               | MEDIUM             |
| CROSS-20    | Post application monitoring                     | 3,9               | MEDIUM             |
| CROSS-23    | General EU chatbot                              | 4,6               | LOW                |
| CROSS-25    | Biometric matching                              | 3,2               | HIGH               |

\*classified as High complexity due to expected technical aspects and related challenges

Table 4 European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (2020)

To have positively impactful humane discussions about migration in the AI age we must be able to consider AI from the lens of jurisdictional layering. The alternative is to wend our way through loopholes between regions and countries and their border policies

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1289 which allow companies and decision makers to collect migration related data, analyze it,  
1290 using AI for decision making in the gaps between governed countries and governed  
1291 human rights. Bircan & Korkmaz posit that: “A central issue concerns who is absent  
1292 from the decision-making table—namely, scholars and data scientists but also civil  
1293 society and migrants themselves”<sup>145</sup>. They recommend that “To be able to overcome  
1294 the existing challenges and be prepared for future complications in global migration  
1295 governance, the discussions should rely on ‘human rights’ and there is a need for clear  
1296 identification for the stakeholders who will closely be involved with decisions and act as  
1297 a controlling body”.

1298  
1299 Just as in the AIDV WG’s *Guidance for Ethics Committees Reviewing AI and DV* we  
1300 argue here in the *AI Bill of Rights Recommendations* that stakeholders governing  
1301 migration and their review boards will have to now include those making AI policy, those  
1302 governing AI rights, and those who are concerned with AI policy compliance.  
1303 Jurisdictional layering affords us an opportunity to consider immigration and AI in such  
1304 a way that we take account the provenance of where models influencing immigration  
1305 are run, whose data they were trained on, how that data was collected and who will be  
1306 impacted by decision making based on those models.

## 1307 Discussion

### 1308 Health/Medicine: in silico clinical trials & Digital Twins

1309 In recent years, *in silico* approaches especially digital twins have demonstrated their ability to  
1310 accurately predict changes in individuals’ health using clinical endpoints. This has led to the  
1311 emergence of computer modeling and simulation technologies in the field of *in silico* medicine.  
1312 These models and digital twins of systems can be constructed using different approaches,  
1313 depending on available technologies, data quality, and knowledge. Knowledge-driven models  
1314 rely on scientific understanding of the human body’s biophysics, biochemistry, and physiology,  
1315 while data-driven models are developed directly from data without making causal assumptions,  
1316 often utilizing artificial intelligence (AI) methods.

1317 While AI methods offer significant power and continue to advance, it is important to exercise  
1318 caution and avoid exaggerated promises that could harm this emerging field. Both knowledge-  
1319 driven and data-driven models have their strengths and limitations, and the choice of approach  
1320 depends on the specific question, context, and available data and knowledge. Combining  
1321 different *in silico* technologies is often necessary to address complex healthcare scenarios.

1322 Several factors should be considered when selecting the most suitable modeling technology for  
1323 a given health scenario. The availability of reliable mechanistic knowledge is crucial, and in its  
1324 absence, data-driven models are preferred. Computational cost varies depending on the

1325 application, with real-time simulations requiring different resources compared to regulatory  
1326 approval processes or medical intervention planning. Each modeling strategy has specific data  
1327 requirements for building, running, and validating predictive models. Obtaining large, high-  
1328 quality datasets remains a challenge in healthcare, with data acquisition, preparation, and  
1329 management costs becoming significant, especially for data-driven models. Additionally,  
1330 establishing the credibility of predictions differs for knowledge-driven and data-driven models, as  
1331 does the risk associated with using them beyond their validation domain or in cases of concept  
1332 drift.

1333 *In silico* or computer modeling and simulation (CM&S) enables the simulation of intricate  
1334 biological systems and the prediction of critical parameters such as drug efficacy and toxicity by  
1335 developing digital twins. By doing so, it reduces the reliance on animal testing and expensive  
1336 clinical trials. This technology has the capacity to streamline the regulatory approval process,  
1337 minimize the environmental footprint associated with drug development, and ultimately enhance  
1338 patient outcomes.

1339 However, the application of *in silico* methods in regulatory processes, post-market surveillance,  
1340 and investigation of adverse events is still limited. The lack of a well-defined process for the  
1341 widespread adoption of *in silico* results in regulatory contexts remains a significant barrier. It is  
1342 crucial to clearly establish the specific context in which *in silico* methods are utilized and  
1343 demonstrate their validity for addressing specific questions of interest.

1344 When we consider the data flow into *in silico* approaches such as integrating data-driven  
1345 elements into knowledge-driven models to complement, assess, or expedite the modeling  
1346 process, particularly when mechanistic knowledge is limited. Personalizing knowledge-driven  
1347 models with patient-specific data into a representative digital twin often requires advanced data-  
1348 driven methods when simple fitting techniques are inadequate. Knowledge-driven models can  
1349 be partially or fully replaced by data-driven surrogate models to meet simulation accuracy and  
1350 speed requirements. Conversely, mechanistic elements can significantly enhance data-driven  
1351 models. Building powerful data-driven models typically requires large amounts of data, but in  
1352 medical applications, the available clinical data may be insufficient. Knowledge-driven models  
1353 can serve as data sources to improve the predictive power of data-driven models, especially for  
1354 rare events. Additionally, knowledge-driven models can be used as benchmarks for testing the  
1355 accuracy of developed algorithms.

1356 The challenges of using *in silico* models in healthcare can be categorized into several dimensions.  
1357 Firstly, the computational cost, which refers to the effort required to obtain predictions within the  
1358 specified time limit. Real-time models used in emergency rooms need to provide quick answers,  
1359 while models for planning surgeries can take longer. Data-driven models have high  
1360 computational costs during construction but low costs during execution, while knowledge-driven  
1361 models have moderate construction costs but potentially higher execution costs. Secondly, data  
1362 requirements play a crucial role. Predictive models need observational data for development

1363 and additional data for validation and testing. Patient-specific data is also necessary for  
1364 personalized predictions and development of digital twins. Different modeling technologies have  
1365 varying data requirements, and the availability and access to reliable data pose significant  
1366 challenges in healthcare. The cost associated with data acquisition and the impact of privacy  
1367 restrictions, such as GDPR, add to the complexity.

1368 Credibility assessment is another dimension to consider. Guidance documents and standards  
1369 provide procedures for assessing the credibility of knowledge-driven models. The identification  
1370 of the question of interest, defining the context of use (CoU), and assessing the model's risk are  
1371 essential steps. The credibility goals are achieved through verification, validation, and  
1372 applicability analysis. The focus is on a "fit-for-purpose" approach, acknowledging that models  
1373 may not be perfect but can still serve a specific CoU given certain quality criteria. For closed  
1374 data-driven models, credibility assessment can be similar to that of knowledge-driven models.  
1375 Some AI models have obtained FDA permission for clinical use. However, self-learning models  
1376 pose challenges as new data can change the entire model, requiring re-validation. Regulatory  
1377 discussions are ongoing to address this challenge, with the FDA considering a lifecycle-based  
1378 regulatory framework for adaptive technologies. Explainability of AI is also an important aspect,  
1379 as requested by the EU-GDPR. Modern AI algorithms, like deep learning, may lack inherent  
1380 explainability, but efforts are being made to develop additional methods to address this issue.  
1381 Knowledge-driven models, on the other hand, are inherently explainable.

1382 Overall, the challenges in using *in silico* models in healthcare include computational costs, data  
1383 requirements, credibility assessment, and explainability, with ongoing discussions and  
1384 developments to address these challenges and ensure the safe and effective use of such  
1385 models in medical decision-making. Leveraging *in silico* and digital twin development  
1386 approaches prior to animal testing or clinical trials to refine results, identify relevant animal  
1387 models and populations, reduce *in vivo* testing, optimize drug dosing, and provide better  
1388 insights for testing on real patients. *In silico* medicine holds promise in overcoming socio-  
1389 economic and technological barriers to medical innovation and improving patient safety.

## 1390 Changing Employment and Education Landscapes

1391 The proliferation of AI Policy and Law at Regional, National, State, and Municipal levels will  
1392 impact education, hiring and careers. There are laws emerging to regulate AI and mitigate bias  
1393 in hiring (see NYC). Both education admissions and broader employment landscapes demand  
1394 Responsible use of AI Systems in candidate selection and bias mitigation. Use of AI in  
1395 Education itself requires thoughtful governance.




1396 In the United States for example, it's been identified that policies are urgently needed to  
1397 implement the following<sup>146</sup>:

- 1398 1. leverage automation to advance learning outcomes while protecting human decision  
1399 making and judgment;

- 1400 2. interrogate the underlying data quality in AI models to ensure fair and unbiased pattern  
1401 recognition and decision making in educational applications, based on accurate  
1402 information appropriate to the pedagogical situation;  
1403 3. enable examination of how particular AI technologies, as part of larger edtech or  
1404 educational systems, may increase or undermine equity for students; and  
1405 4. take steps to safeguard and advance equity, including providing for human checks and  
1406 balances and limiting any AI systems and tools that undermine equity.

1407 Current ethics expectations for students, faculty, and employees will need to be expanded and  
1408 rethought to encompass the breadth of challenges presented by AI. There are new career paths  
1409 emerging in AI operations and governance. These will demand skills in ethics, policy, model  
1410 creation, deployment, management of data for AI systems, and data/model governance.

## 1411 Acknowledgments

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1414  
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1418 the support provided by the EOSC-Future and RDA communities and structures.

1419  
1420 [document end]

1421

1422

## 1423 Endnotes

- 1424 1. 'IEEE Recommended Practice for Assessing the Impact of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems on  
1425 Human Well-Being'. May 01, 2020. doi: [10.1109/IEEESTD.2020.9084219](https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2020.9084219). Available:  
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1463 almost 20 years later in 2003 under President George W. Bush, who then said the agency had undertaken needed  
1464 reforms, then stopped paying in 2011 when Palestine became a full member because such funding is barred by U.S.  
1465 law. Israel and The United States formally withdrew from the U.N. cultural agency again in December 2018 over  
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Recommendations for Review  
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